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Positive Incentives for Climate Change Action: 
Some Reflections 
  
Christian Egenhofer, Bo Kjellén, Sivan Kartha 
& Vivek Kumar 
ECP Report No. 5/June 2008 
Executive Summary 
he Bali Action Plan has provided a structure, timelines, building blocks and key words to 
accelerate the negotiations on a future climate change regime. Despite this progress, 
however, positions between the different parties still remain far apart. The European 
Climate Platform (ECP) held a small high-level meeting in Madrid on 17 & 18 April 2008, to 
bring together senior negotiators, policy-makers, researchers and stakeholders from both 
developing and developed countries in order to develop analytical tools, increase understanding 
and frame the key trade-offs to start narrowing this gap. 
Background papers served as an introduction to the discussions. This enabled us to go beyond 
the well-trodden paths and brought to light some interesting pointers and several new ideas. 
This report presents the main themes and conclusions from the seminar. It covers four areas:  
•  the state of the negotiations; 
•  an analytical framework for identifying “measurable, reportable and verifiable” mitigation 
commitments by developed countries, i.e. implementation of Art. 1(II) b of the Bali Action 
Plan; 
•  the potential for a bottom-up approach for India and  
•  the weakening rationale for the Annex I/non-Annex I differentiation in globally trading 
energy-intensive sectors and global sectoral approaches. 
Conclusions & Key Messages 
The state of the negotiations 
1.  A successful conclusion of the Copenhagen negotiations in December 2008 will require 
unequivocal political leadership. The technical complexities and the overarching equity 
equation appear to be too great to be solved at the technical negotiations level only. This 
observation is significant because it has implications both for governments’ strategies to 
approach the negotiations and also for the need to mobilise civil society. 
2.  The current distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries masks both important 
differences within and similarities between the two categories. Instead the idea of a three-
category distinction could emerge:  
•  Category I (e.g. OECD) with 13.5 t/CO2 emissions per capita on average in 2005 = 
some 1 billion population; 
•  Category II (non-OECD above 3t/CO2 emissions with 5.5 t/CO2e per capita on average 
in 2005 = some 2 billion population (this includes most fast-growing emerging 
economies but not India, for example, because of its low emissions); and 
T 2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
•  Category III (e.g. least developed and other comparable countries) below 1 t/CO2 
emissions per capita on average in 2005 = some 3 billion population. 
This leads to three immediate policy implications: 
a)  Given the low per capita emissions of category III, almost all of the absolute emissions 
reductions will need to be undertaken by categories I + II. At the same time, Annex 1 
reductions will not suffice to meet climate change objectives. See also Background 
Paper No. 1. Responsibility for emissions reductions, including payment into global 
funds, would clearly lie with countries in categories I and II. 
b)  Another important, yet worrying, implication is that the stringency of a global target 
implicitly rules out the required headroom for increasing emissions of category III 
countries. If one assumes a per capita allowance of around 1.2 t/CO2 – a figure broadly 
estimated to be in line with the 2° C target and a 2050 CO2 emissions level equal to 50% 
of the 1990 level of CO2 emissions – category I countries would need to reduce CO2 
emissions by around 88% of their 2005 level, and category II by around 76% by 2050. 
And even such steep reductions would allow category III countries to increase their 
emissions by a mere 107%. The latter, in fact, would leave very little headroom for 
these countries to combat poverty and improve living conditions (if one assumes that 
some increase in emissions is necessary to improve living conditions). This situation 
starkly illustrates how absolutely critical it is that these countries are provided the 
extensive technological and financial support needed to enable development to proceed 
along a low-carbon pathway. 
c)  A third implication is that the offsetting of category I (and to an extent of category II) 
emissions, e.g. through the CDM, will continue to be difficult due to scale limitations 
and a lack of physical reduction potential in category III countries with an average of 1 
metric tonne per capita. In other words, even if it were hypothetically possible to 
virtually eliminate category III emissions through offset activities, it would not 
eliminate the need for dramatic emissions reductions in category I and even category II 
countries. Offsetting mechanisms such as the CDM – to the extent that it enables Annex 
I countries to continue emitting – is at odds with long-term climate change targets.  
The only way to address the issues raised under b and c above is to create additional 
headroom for category III countries in need of additional headroom for development. This 
can be done only if category I countries are actually assigned a negative emissions 
allowance and category II countries maintain the stringent cuts of 70-80%. See 
Background Paper No. 1. Alternatively, the headroom can be increased by relaxing the 2° 
C target – an option that was not regarded as prudent. 
To keep developing countries engaged in the global carbon market and even to scale up 
carbon markets, new mechanisms are needed. Different ideas are emerging such as sector-
based approaches, ‘no-lose targets’
1 for developing countries, sustainable development 
policies & measures worldwide, binding sectoral targets and instruments to deal with 
REDD and adaptation. The CDM is an important tool to establish an international 
framework including developing countries for carbon markets. Yet improving the current 
CDM may be a second-best option not only due to its nature as an offsetting mechanism 
but also because of many design and institutional issues.  
                                                      
1 Developing countries take voluntary targets and receive credits – to be sold in the global carbon market 
– if they meet their commitment. See Background Paper No. 3. POSITIVE INCENTIVES | 3 
 
The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework to implement Art. 1 (II) b of the Bali 
Action Plan 
3.  The central principle of Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) is the right to develop, 
rather than a right to emit. Emissions are taken as merely instrumental, as having 
importance only insofar as they contribute to development. As a result the concept defines a 
‘development threshold’. Individuals below this level are not expected to share the burden 
of mitigating the climate problem, but rather are rightfully enabled to give priority to 
development. With respect to those above the development threshold, it identifies a burden-
sharing framework based on the two underlying UNFCCC principles: capacity and 
responsibility. Taken together, they allow the calculation of national obligations under a 
climate regime. Despite the numerous methodological questions and the expected political 
difficulty inherent in agreeing such a framework, there is major value in it as any burden-
sharing agreement will need to be rooted in analytical work. GDRs have considerable value 
in two areas: 
•  As a strong analytical framework to indicate the possible shape of an equitable global 
climate change agreement; as such the framework could shift the starting point from 
which to start negotiations and put them onto a more evidence-based and fair footing. It 
was interesting to note that the Mexican proposal for a Multinational Climate Change 
Fund arrives at similar results to the GDRs, although using different parameters. 
•  While emissions targets are unlikely to be set by a scientific method such as the GDRs, 
the framework could nevertheless be used to approximate the contribution that each 
country has to make to global climate change funds. 
A bottom-up approach for India 
4.  Bottom-up approaches allow a focus on creating and designing (the right) incentives for 
concrete actions, mainly but not exclusively at country-level, in an international coordinated 
way. Such bottom up-approaches will however need to be backed up by top-down 
approaches in developed countries to re-direct necessary financial flows. Bottom-up sector-
specific identification of mitigation (and adaptation) options provides important information 
to negotiators as it helps create an understanding of country-specific situations. However, its 
use for GHG reductions reaches its limits when the policy drivers are energy security and 
access to energy. Bottom-up approaches – like top-down approaches – depend on reliable 
monitoring, reporting and verification; hence capacity-building becomes indispensible. The 
biggest obstacle is lack of data, however. On the other hand, possibly the greatest value of 
bottom-up approaches is their focus on ‘opportunities’ (and/or ‘positive incentives’) rather 
than on ‘burden’-sharing, which makes negotiations difficult. Bottom-up approaches were 
seen as a means for developing countries both to prove engagement on climate change for 
the negotiations and to start reducing emissions. 
A weakening rationale for Annex I/non-Annex I differentiation in globally trading energy-
intensive industries and the role of sectoral approaches  
5.  Major companies of globally trading sectors in Annex I and non-Annex I countries are, 
broadly speaking comparable, except for country-specific resources (e.g. availability of gas 
versus coal or availability of raw material inputs) and technology endowments. Where the 
resource and technology endowments are also similar, the case for differentiation within the 
globally traded industrial sectors between Annex I and non-Annex I is weakened. One of 
the tentative conclusions of the seminar was that differentiation of responsibility should be 
applied to globally trading industrial sectors only to the extent that the resource endowments 
are different, and even then incentives must be put in place to remove some of the 
differences, including variations in applied technologies. As a result, one might think of 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
dividing the national economies into globally-trading sectors (e.g. steel, aluminium, cement, 
paper and pulp, etc.) and non-globally trading sectors (i.e. the rest of the economy). 
Identifying the sectors will not be easy and will necessitate a political deal. Yet it could be 
based on a simple calculation such as the share of carbon costs in variable costs of 
production costs of a sector. While for the rest of the economy (i.e. everything that is not 
trading globally), the ‘differentiation’ approach of the UNFCCC would fully apply: 
globally-traded sectors would be subject to a sector-wide global (sectoral) policy or 
agreement that duly recognises resource and technological differences. A similar approach 
was taken by the EU when dividing up the respective shares of its member states as a means 
to meet the 20% GHG reduction targets. It is interesting to note that even in the EU ETS 
sector, there was differentiation in the form of a redistribution of auctioning rights from 
richer to poorer member states to compensate for disproportionately higher costs. However, 
it was recognised that applying the same principles on a global basis would raise significant 
issues with regard to competition and trade. 
6.  This raises the question of which sectoral approach model could address the differentiation 
issue. To date, we can distinguish three different – notional – models of sectoral approaches, 
Sector-wide transnational (global industry) approaches, bottom-up country commitments 
and top-down sectoral crediting as an incentive mechanism. All these models share a 
number of common elements, including: i) the collection of data and information about the 
sector to establish performance indicators or benchmarks, ii) the sharing and diffusion of 
‘best practices’ within companies and iii) attempts to engage major companies of emerging 
economies, where most emissions growth and reduction potential lie. At the same time, 
global sectoral industry approaches as well as sectoral approaches in general, face five 
major challenges: i) technical issues related to data definition and collection; ii) risk of anti-
competitive behaviour; iii) calibrating the sectoral performance across countries to reflect 
differences in resource endowments and technology; iv) identifying workable incentives for 
companies and governments from developing countries, mainly emerging economies, to 
engage in sectoral approaches; and v) forming a suitable governance structure. Sectoral 
approaches will also need to fit into domestic and global climate change policy priorities. 
We formulate below some conclusions.  
-  Given the diversity of sectoral approaches, general statements on sectoral approaches in 
a generic sense are misleading. Instead, discussions on sectoral approaches first need to 
define the specifics of the model in question;  
-  Sectoral approaches, especially when industry-led, may provide a more accurate picture 
of the economic reality within which business operates than the UN-based concept of 
sovereignty. There was a general acknowledgment that negotiators need to ‘find a 
space’ to introduce the new business reality. 
-  Sectoral approaches can be designed in such a way as to allow a distinction between 
globally-trading sectors and non-globally trading sectors (i.e. the rest of the economy).  
-  There is no doubt that developing countries will oppose any attempts to use sectoral 
approaches to move climate change negotiations from the UN to a non-UN body. On 
the other hand, the potential of sectoral approaches – irrespective of the model – to 
assist in improving data, share best-practice, aid technology transfer and generally 
increase developing country capacity is highly appreciated.  
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Part I. Analysis and Key Findings 
1. Introduction 
The European Climate Platform (ECP) convened a two-day seminar in Madrid, 17-18 April 
2008, with a number of high-level climate change negotiators, policy-makers and stakeholders 
from developed and developing countries to meet with researchers to discuss the challenges of a 
future climate change agreement. The focus of the discussion was the potential of ‘positive 
incentives’. Participants investigated whether positive incentives are more than just a slogan, 
whether they can be designed in such a way as to advance international climate change 
negotiations and if so, what would be the optimum conditions to achieve this?  
Discussions were supported by three substantive Background Papers. The first by Sivan Kartha 
and Bo Kjellén dealt with a possible step forward to implement the so-called ‘Bali Developing 
Country Paragraph’, (i.e. Art. 1(B) II of Decision 1/CP.13 ii) by providing analytical support. 
The second background paper by Vivek Kumar et al. proposed a bottom-up approach for India 
and the third, written by Christian Egenhofer, considered whether sectoral approaches could be 
a way forward and under what preconditions. The seminar was concluded by a discussion on the 
(perceived) state of negotiations after the Bangkok meeting and a summing-up session.  
The background papers prepared for the ECP seminar were based on research undertaken by the 
Clipore research project, complemented by CEPS and other research. They are annexed in Part 
II and will also be published, slightly revised, in the Special Edition on low-carbon technologies 
of the European Review of Energy Markets (EREM) to appear later in 2008.  
As expected, the discussions did not yield unanimous or unambiguous conclusions. But many 
interesting pointers and a number of new ideas emerged from the discussions. This report 
presents the most important themes and conclusions as we saw them and covers four areas: the 
state of the negotiations, an analytical framework for identifying ‘measurable, reportable and 
verifiable’ mitigation commitments by developed countries (i.e. implementation of Art. 1(II) b 
of the Bali Action Plan), the potential for a bottom-up approach for India and sectoral 
approaches. 
2.  The State of the Negotiations: The bar trembles, will it fall?  
Given the background of the participants present, it was no surprise that a broad range of issues 
was raised. This report however focuses on the state of negotiations, the changing landscape for 
differentiation, the CDM/post-2012 mechanisms and competitiveness.  
The Bali agreement breaks new ground by setting out a structure, specific time line, building 
blocks and key words for climate change action. The general analysis and understanding of the 
key areas is gradually increasing. Notwithstanding this progress, differences on controversial 
areas remain unresolved. G77 and China especially remain wary of non-UNFCCC initiatives 
such as the Major Economies Meetings (MEM), mainly because of ‘asymmetric governance’
1 
structures. Equity remains an equally sensitive issue and it appears that the enabling political 
positions for a far-reaching global deal are still being crafted. The discussions on 
competitiveness are just one example of the minefield of controversial issues surrounding the 
climate debate. Without finding a solution to competitiveness concerns in developed countries, 
                                                      
1 By this term we mean the disproportionate influence exercised by OECD countries as a result of their 
ability to dedicate more resources to such meetings. The fact that the participation of G8+5 or MEM is 
based on ‘total emissions’ reinforces the overrepresentation of OECD countries, compared for example to 
‘population’ as a criterion for choosing participants. 6 | EGENHOFER, KJELLÉN, KARTHA & KUMAR 
 
there is little hope for a global deal, either from the US or the European perspective. The same 
holds for developing country commitments.  
G77 plus China is equally suspicious of Annex I countries’ progress on the key elements of an 
equitable response by Annex I to climate change. Some of the concerns voiced include:  
•  climate change is happening and urgent action is needed in Annex I countries;  
•  emissions reduction should first occur in Annex I countries; 
•  the need to ensure that developing countries can proceed unimpeded towards poverty 
alleviation and sustainable human development; 
•  the primacy of adaptation for the developing world; 
•  measures to deal with technology transfer and capacity-building; 
•  making new and additional funding available over and above normal ODA; 
•  preventing carbon and climate-related conditionality from creeping into ODA; and 
•  ensuring that the principal motivation for new initiatives, such as sectoral approaches is not 
competitiveness.  
While the meetings in Bali were seen as problematic but nevertheless promising in terms of its 
response to these concerns, the same sense of urgency was largely absent in Bangkok. As 
technical negotiations continue, the key political questions remain un-addressed.  
The conclusion was that without political leadership to address the delicate equity-related issues 
outlined above, there is little chance of reaching agreement. Negotiators will most likely not be 
able to reach a deal on their own. The need for political leadership, however, would need to be 
first acknowledged and then supported by civil society, especially in Annex I countries. A clear 
indication by politicians of what a Copenhagen Protocol will need to agree upon would be 
helpful.  
2.1  Overcoming the Annex I/non-Annex I divide 
Participants agreed that the current Annex I and non-Annex I distinction is misleading and 
counterproductive. It is well understood that there are important differences within the 
categories as well as, to an extent, similarities between the categories. Most importantly, there is 
a major distinction within non-Annex I countries in terms of per capita income, poverty and per 
capita emissions. Throughout the seminar participants relied on a three-part distinction as being 
a helpful rubric, based on per capita emissions, which to an extent can be used as a proxy for 
wealth. Such a three-part division divides the world into three categories as outlined in the box 
below. Category I comprises some 1.1 billion people, category II some 2.2 billion while 
category III encompasses around half of the world’s total population, i.e. 3.2 billion. 
Box 1. Alternative country grouping, based on carbon emissions 
•  Cat I (OECD and alike) with 13.5 t/CO2 emissions per capita on average in 2005 = some 1 
billion population. 
•  Cat II (non-OECD) with 5.5 t/CO2 emissions per capita on average = 2 billion. This includes 
most fast-growing emerging economies but for example not India because of its low per 
capita emissions. 
•  Cat III (e.g. least developed and other comparable countries) with 1t/CO2 emissions per capita 
on average in 2005 = 3 billion population. POSITIVE INCENTIVES | 7 
 
This division of the world’s nations leads to three crucial implications: 
•  First, given the low per capita emissions of category III, almost all of the absolute emissions 
reductions will need to be undertaken by the OECD countries and the countries in category 
II, which includes some but not all emerging economies. Emissions reduction by Annex I 
countries alone will not be sufficient to meet climate change objectives. This is documented 
in Background Paper No. 1. The costs for emissions reductions would almost exclusively 
fall on these two categories, with a disproportionate obligation on Category I. By extension, 
this would also mean that contributions to global funding, e.g. along the lines of the 
proposal by the Mexican president for a Multinational Climate Change Fund that would 
mobilise at least $10 billion annually would also fall overwhelmingly on Category I + II 
countries. Given the development profile of Category III, this group of around 3 billion 
people would undertake sustainable development policies (SD-PAMs) and not contribute to 
a Multinational Climate Change Fund. This theme is further developed in section 3 and Part 
II. 
•  An even more striking implication is that the target level of emissions that the global 
community will accept as being ‘safe’ say by 2050 will determine the available emissions 
headroom for development and raising access to energy and consequently reducing poverty 
and building adaptive capacity in category III countries. If one assumes a per capita CO2 
emissions endowment of around 1.2 metric tonnes per capita in 2050 – a figure broadly 
estimated to be in line with the 2° C target and a 2050 CO2 emissions level equal to 50% of 
the 1990 level of CO2 emissions – category I countries would need to reduce CO2 emissions 
by around 88% while Category II by around 76% over their respective 2005 levels of CO2 
emissions. And still, even such steep reductions would only allow category III countries to 
increase their emissions by a mere 107%, which in fact leaves very little emissions 
headroom for these countries to combat poverty (if one assumes that some increase of 
emissions is necessary to improve living conditions). This situation starkly illustrates how 
absolutely critical it is that these countries are provided the extensive technological and 
financial support needed to enable development to proceed along a low-carbon pathway. 
•  A third implication is that the offsetting of category I (and to an extent of category II) 
emissions e.g. through the CDM will not be possible due to scale limitations. There is not 
enough physical reduction potential in category III countries with an average of around 1 
metric tonne per capita (even if for 3 billion people) for one billion people with average per 
capita emissions of 13.5 and another 2 billion with average per capita emissions of 5.5 
metric tonnes. In other words, even if it were hypothetically possible to virtually eliminate 
category III emissions through offset activities, it would not eliminate the need for dramatic 
emissions reductions in category I and even category II countries. 
The only way the issues raised under the second and the third bullet points above can be 
addressed is to create additional headroom for countries in need of additional headroom for 
development. This can be done only if wealthier countries are actually assigned a negative 
emissions allowance. Alternatively, the headroom can be increased by relaxing the 2°C target – 
an option that was regarded as imprudent.  
2.2  Post-2012 mechanisms and the CDM 
This leads us to the question of the reform of the CDM (clean development mechanism). 
Essentially the CDM has been seen as a tool to build up the institutional framework for a carbon 
market in developing countries and to provide a carbon signal. However, simple offsetting 
mechanisms – to enable Annex I countries to continue emitting – are increasingly at odds with 
long-term climate change imperatives and emission targets. A strategy based solely on 8 | EGENHOFER, KJELLÉN, KARTHA & KUMAR 
 
offsetting will render it impossible to get near to halving global emissions by 2050. There was a 
belief that it is important to find the means to scale up participation among developing 
countries, for example to transform the CDM into a crediting instrument. Proposals include, for 
example, sector-based approaches such as the ‘no-lose targets’
2 for developing countries, 
sustainable development policies & measures worldwide, binding sectoral targets and 
instruments to deal with REDD and adaptation. Improving the CDM
3 may be difficult not only 
because of its nature as an off-setting mechanism but also due to many design and institutional 
issues. Developing countries tend to be aligned along either ‘no-lose targets’ – most support the 
CCAP approach – or sustainable development policies and measures.  
2.3  Differentiation and competitiveness 
Also related to this is the differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, which 
raises a fundamental issue that, even with the further refinement of categories, would not 
disappear. Distinctions will need to be broad – in order to keep the relative simplicity of any 
scheme adopted – but at the same time they should not mask important similarities that exist 
among sectors. Major companies of globally trading sectors in OECD and developing countries 
are broadly comparable except for country-specific resources (e.g. availability of gas versus coal 
or availability of raw material inputs) and technology endowments. Where the resource and 
technology endowments are also similar, the case for differentiation between Annex I and non-
Annex I countries for globally traded industrial sector is considerably weakened. It becomes 
clear that competitiveness concerns will need to be addressed for Annex I countries to be able to 
make a deal. However, if competitive concerns are the driving force behind any new 
mechanism, the mechanism would need to calibrate the differences in resources and technology 
endowments to address non-Annex I concerns.  
A possible solution could be to divide parties’ economies into globally trading segments and 
non-trading segments. While full differentiation would apply to the non-trading segments, there 
would be differentiation for the trading segments if justified, such as imbalances in resource 
endowments and/or technology. While such an approach would broadly keep intact the Annex I 
and non-Annex I categorisation, it would do away with distortions that arise from asymmetric 
climate policies. A similar approach is applied by the EU, which divided the economies of its 
member states into trading (i.e. EU ETS) and non-trading sectors. The task of distinguishing 
between trading and non-trading sectors will be very difficult in reality, but ongoing work in the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate Change (APP) or industry-led 
sectoral approaches will most likely provide lessons (see section 5 on sectoral approaches). 
However, it was recognised that applying the same principles on a global basis would raise 
significant issues in relation to competition and trade. 
It should be emphasised that while section 2.3 talks about the differentiation between Annex I 
and Annex II countries, the general consensus was that these two categories did not paint the 
full picture and needed further refinement. 
The following sections summarise the essence of the background papers and highlight the key 
findings of the discussions.  
                                                      
2 Developing countries take voluntary targets and receive credits – to be sold on the global carbon market 
– if they meet their commitment.  
3 See ECP Report No. 1, Improving the Clean Development Mechanism, Christian Egenhofer, Louise van 
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3.  Linking developing countries’ measurable, reportable and verifiable 
mitigation actions to measurable, reportable and verifiable financial 
and technical support  
This paper by Kartha and Kjellén attempts to provide some useful indicative results as to what 
the Bali Action Plan might mean with the words “measurable, reportable and verifiable” and 
“adequate, predictable and sustainable” by applying the Greenhouse Development Rights 
(GDR) framework.  
3.1  The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework  
The central principle of the GDR framework is the right to development, rather than a right to 
emissions. Emissions are taken as merely instrumental, as having importance only insofar as 
they contribute to development. The right to develop is a right to a certain level of welfare 
beyond the mere satisfaction of basic needs, but well short of today’s levels of ‘affluent’ 
consumption.  
•  As a result, the GDR framework defines a ‘development threshold’. Individuals below this 
level are not expected to share the burden of mitigating the climate problem, as they have 
little responsibility for the climate problem and relatively little capacity to invest in solving 
it. They are instead enabled to pursue their rightful priority of human development. 
•  With respect to those above the development threshold, the approach defines a burden-
sharing framework. This is based on the same two principles that underlie the UNFCCC: 
capacity and responsibility.  
From this starting point, it is then possible to indicatively quantify national obligations under a 
climate regime. One can examine in an explicit and quantitative manner the question of the 
international support raised by the aforementioned clauses 1(b)ii and 1(e)i in the Bali roadmap. 
The results are quite predictable: see Table 1 for a representative set of countries and regions.  
Table 1. Global shares of population, income, capacity, cumulative emissions, responsibility, 
and obligation (RCI) for selected countries and groups of countries (%) 
  Population  Income Capacity 
Cumulative 
Emissions
(1990-2005) Responsibility 
Obligation
(RCI) 
US  4.7  22.2  33.7  23.7  38.2  36.0 
EU27  7.6  23.2  30.0  17.8  23.5  27.4 
UK  0.9  3.4  4.7  2.5  3.6  4.3 
Germany  1.3  4.5  6.1  3.8  5.4  5.9 
Russia  2.2  3.0  2.0  7.4  5.1  2.9 
Brazil  2.9  2.8  2.2  1.3  1.1  1.7 
China  20.4  10.0  2.3  13.8  3.4  2.7 
India  17.0  4.2  0.1  3.8  0.1  0.1 
South Africa  0.7  0.7  0.6  1.6  1.3  0.8 
LDCs  11.6  1.5  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0 
All High Income  15.6  59.1  83.4  52.7  79.4  82.3 
All Middle 
Income  47.7  33.5  16.5  41.1  20.5  17.6 
All Low Income  36.7  7.4  0.1  6.2  0.1  0.1 
World  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
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The US has somewhat less than a third of the total global obligation, the EU27 have somewhat 
less than one-quarter, China has 6% (more than, for example, Germany) and India less than 1%. 
The implication is that all countries – in both Annex I and non-Annex I − are obligated to invest 
in bringing emissions under control, but that those with greater capacity and responsibility are 
obligated to invest much more, and that these investments must be made in the form of domestic 
mitigation as well as technology and finance to support and enable mitigation in other countries. 
A clear conclusion is that commitments being considered thus far by Annex I countries are 
inadequate. Further details are provided in Background Paper No. 1 in Part II. 
3.2  Policy implications and conclusions  
The analysis clarified what the phrase “measurable, reportable and verifiable” and “adequate, 
predictable and sustainable” international support could mean in practice. Each party’s national 
obligation would amount to its share of the global obligation times the global total cost of 
adaptation and mitigation. These calculations of national obligation explicitly account for the 
wealth and poverty in each country, and its distribution within each country. They reflect the 
presence in each country (each Annex I country, China, India, even the LDCs) of a sub-
population that is part of the global consuming class and that rightfully has obligations under an 
international climate regime. They also reflect the presence in each country of individuals who 
have not yet attained a decent standard of living, and who thus are not expected to contribute to 
their country’s obligations.  
Despite the inevitable political difficulty to actually agree on such a framework and the thorny 
methodological issues that would need to be resolved, analytical work has found the framework 
to be of high potential for the post-2012 negotiations.  
•  As a regime architecture, it directly reflects the underlying structure of the linked 
development and climate challenges confronting us, and it presents a path forward that 
reconciles the two. 
•  While actual national obligations will inevitably be established through negotiations that 
involves many political factors, the GDR framework can nevertheless serve as a reference 
framework. It can serve as a principle-based and quantitatively transparent analytical 
framework that indicates the shape of a global climate change agreement that would be 
politically viable by virtue of the fact that it explicitly recognises and safeguards a right to 
development. As such, the framework could shift the point from which negotiations start 
and put them onto a more evidence-based and fair footing. It can thus be used to establish, 
for example, the contribution that each country must make to global climate change funds 
such as Mexico’s proposal for a Multinational Climate Change Fund. It is notable that the 
Mexican figures for parties’ contributions are similar to the ones identified by Kartha and 
Kjellén. 
4.  A bottom-up sectoral approach for India  
Background paper No. 2 by Kumar et al. discussed how a bottom-up approach may provide 
better incentives for India to engage in a global agreement to combat climate change than a 
purely top-down approach.  
4.1  Creating and exploiting incentives  
The starting point of the analysis was that a bottom-up approach focuses on creating and 
designing (the right) incentives for concrete actions, mainly but not exclusively, at country-POSITIVE INCENTIVES | 11 
 
level, in an internationally coordinated way. This is different from a top-down approach, which 
imposes GHG emissions targets on a Party level and leaves the implementation details to the 
countries themselves. 
New energy infrastructure investments in developing countries, upgrades of energy 
infrastructure in industrialised countries and policies that promote energy security can, in many 
cases, create opportunities to achieve GHG emission reductions. A bottom-up approach can – 
under certain conditions – ensure efficient utilisation of energy and resources in the 
infrastructure being added in developing countries along with addressing environment and 
climate change issues. The developing countries may be concerned by a restraint on economic 
growth as a result of a top-down approach. A bottom-up approach to an international climate 
agreement may provide better incentives for India to engage in such a global agreement to 
combat climate change. The basic rationale is that such an approach could offer better 
opportunities to ensure that the mechanisms of the agreement are aligned with the priorities 
identified at the country level in India.  
No country has substantially reduced poverty without massively increasing its use of energy. 
Given the strong correlation between economic activity and growth in energy and infrastructure, 
it is evident that the energy requirements of a country would increase rapidly. The challenge 
facing India is to meet its energy needs in a sustainable manner. This would require an 
introduction of energy conservation and energy efficiency improvement across different sectors. 
Bottom-up approaches can serve this purpose if such approaches are able to address the key 
barriers such as lack of funding, access to technologies, confidence in technology, awareness 
generation and capacity-building, etc. Some of these barriers could be tackled through domestic 
policy interventions while for others additional support through bilateral collaboration may be 
helpful.  
4.2  Policy implications and conclusions 
Bottom-up, sector-specific identification of mitigation (and adaptation) options provides 
important information to negotiators as it helps them to understand the situation in the different 
countries. A number of qualifications have to be made, however, as noted below: 
-  It is not always clear what are the drivers behind bottom-up approaches; in developing 
countries more often than not the driver is energy security and access to energy rather than 
climate GHG mitigation. 
-  Bottom-up approaches – similar to top-down approaches – depend on reliable monitoring, 
reporting and verification; hence capacity-building also becomes indispensible for bottom-
up approaches. 
-  In many sectors there is a total lack of reliable data, if not a total lack of data. 
-  Sectors are very heterogeneous and their grouping together masks important differences. 
-  No-regret options do not materialise on their own but need to be supported by government 
policies. 
There was a consensus that bottom-up, sector-specific measures at country level are a suitable 
option to engage in global climate change policy provided that the above limitations are 
overcome. Nevertheless, bottom-up approaches on their own do not work as it is top-down 
approaches that impose a carbon constraint, trading mechanisms that ultimately direct financial 
flows. The discussions also revealed important differences in the role of sectoral approaches in 
the two AWGs. While AWG-KP sees bottom-up measures as a tool for target-setting, the 12 | EGENHOFER, KJELLÉN, KARTHA & KUMAR 
 
AWG-LCA acknowledges ‘country-specific bottom-up sectoral approaches’ as a suitable 
measure in their own right.  
Possibly the most important outcome of the discussions was to focus on ‘opportunities’ (and/or 
positive incentives) rather than on top-down burden-sharing, which makes negotiations difficult. 
Bottom-up approaches were seen as a means for developing countries both to prove their 
engagement with climate change for the negotiations and to start reducing emissions. 
5.  Which of the different sectoral approaches can be implemented?  
The final background paper deals with sectoral approaches. In particular, it asks which of the 
different basic models has the best chance of being implemented and what the enabling 
conditions would be.  
5.1  Sectoral approaches and the way forward 
The paper distinguished between three different – notional – models of sectoral approaches: 
•  Sector-wide transnational approaches, e.g. transnational industry-led approaches that aim to 
engage a sector on a broad international basis or global sectoral industry approaches 
(‘global sectoral industry approaches’);  
•  Bottom-up country commitments, possibly combined with no-lose targets; and 
•  Top-down sectoral crediting as an incentive mechanism, e.g. a sectoral Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). 
The focus was on so-called ‘sector-wide transnational’, i.e. industry-led or as the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) calls them, global sectoral industry approaches such as the Cement 
Sustainability Initiative (CSI). The initiatives under the International Iron and Steel Institute 
(IISI), the International Aluminium Institute (IAI) and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate Change (APP) have all significant progress. These models share a 
number of common elements, including 
1)  the collection of data and information about the sector to establish performance indicators or 
benchmarks;  
2)  the sharing and diffusion of ‘best practices’ within companies to enhance monitoring, 
reporting and verification of emissions and operational efficiency, including diffusion of 
technology within the sector; and  
3)  engaging major companies of emerging economies, where most emissions growth and 
reduction potential lies. 
At the same time, global sectoral industry approaches as well as sectoral approaches in general, 
face four major challenges: 
•  technical issues related to data definition and collection; 
•  risk of anti-competitive behaviour; 
•  identifying workable incentives for companies and governments from developing countries, 
mainly emerging economies, to engage in sectoral approaches; and 
•  forming a suitable governance structure. 
If sectoral approaches are taken further in the EU and elsewhere, they will need to fit into 
domestic and international policy priorities. Turning to the EU, from an EU perspective, POSITIVE INCENTIVES | 13 
 
potentially the strongest link between national sectoral approaches and EU policies are with the 
EU ETS and the global carbon market. Benchmarks could play a useful role for cap-setting (i.e. 
agreeing overall targets) and/or allocation, i.e. distribution of the allowances among 
installations, for the development of global carbon markets and finally as a means to engage 
developing countries.  
5.2  Policy implications and conclusions 
Given the diversity of sectoral approaches, general statements on sectoral approaches are 
misleading. Instead, discussions on sectoral approaches need to define the specifics of the model 
in question first. 
One of the tentative conclusions has been that the differentiation of responsibility may not apply 
to globally trading industrial sectors. As a result, one might think of dividing the national 
economies into the globally-trading sectors (e.g. steel, aluminium, cement, paper and pulp, etc.) 
and non-globally trading sectors (i.e. the rest of the economy). Identifying the sectors will not be 
easy and will necessitate a political deal. Yet it could be based on a simple calculation such as 
the share of carbon costs of variable costs of total production costs of a sector. While for the rest 
of the economy (i.e. everything that is not trading globally) the ‘differentiation’ approach of the 
UNFCCC would fully apply: globally-traded sectors would be subject to a sector-wide global 
(sectoral) policy or agreement. A similar approach was taken by the EU when dividing up the 
respective shares of its member states to meet the 20 GHG reduction target. The EU ETS 
(trading) sector has been subjected to an EU-wide sectoral policy, i.e. the EU ETS based on an 
EU-wide cap and EU-wide harmonised allocation methodologies while within the non-EU ETS 
sectors, differentiated targets based on relative wealth have been agreed (although details still 
need to be confirmed). It is interesting to note that even in the EU ETS sector, there has been 
differentiation in the form of a redistribution of auctioning rights from richer to poorer member 
states to compensate the poorer member states for disproportionately higher costs. Such 
differentiation could for example take the form of different baselines for less developed 
countries in, for example, a sectoral crediting scheme, possibly along the lines of a ‘no-lose’ 
target. However, such a sectoral crediting mechanism would need to rely on an ambitious 
baseline, in order to ensure a carbon (price) signal in the form of ‘opportunity costs’, thereby 
avoiding the situation whereby a crediting mechanism degenerates into a pure subsidy 
mechanism.  
For the period 2013-20, before a single global carbon market is expected to be in place, the EU 
foresees the development of a global carbon market through a linking of the EU ETS with other 
domestic emissions trading schemes. Linking may require adjustment in design options between 
different schemes however. It may be facilitated and accelerated by the convergence of central 
design options such as MRV,
4 cap-setting and (free) allocation. Sectoral approaches, including 
benchmarks, could facilitate such a convergence.  
Experiences from data collection and benchmarking exercises under sectoral approaches could 
possibly become a tool to give concrete meaning to the Bali Developing Country Paragraph. 
Both ‘measuring, reporting and verification’ of ‘actions’ to which developing countries have 
signed up in the Bali Action Plan and ‘measurable and verifiable’ assistance in financing and 
technology transfer by developed countries may be more easily implemented at sectoral level.  
Sectoral approaches, especially if industry-led, may provide a more accurate picture of the 
economic reality within which business operates than the UN-based concept of sovereignty. The 
perceived dichotomy between Annex I and non-Annex I business no longer holds for globally 
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trading sectors such as steel, cement or aluminium. Companies headquartered in non-Annex I 
countries have on many occasions significant operations in Annex I countries and vice-versa. 
This trend is most likely to accelerate. Sectoral approaches may be a tool to capture this new 
reality.  
For sectoral approaches to work, there is a need for a global political deal within the UN 
negotiations. Provided that the challenges of global sectoral industry approaches and sectoral 
approaches can be met in terms of data collection, risks of anti-competitive behaviour, engaging 
developing countries and governance, equity issues are at present under a sectoral approach-
based scheme as they are in the climate change discussion. There is no doubt that developing 
countries will oppose any attempt to use sectoral approaches to move climate change 
negotiations from the UN to a non-EU body. On the other hand, the potential of sectoral 
approaches – irrespective of the model – to assist in improving data, sharing best-practice, aid 
technology transfer and generally increasing developing country capacity is highly appreciated.  
6. Final  remarks 
The Bali Action Plan has provided us with a structure, timelines, building blocks and key 
wording in the field of climate change. Despite this progress, however, the Bangkok meeting 
made clear once again that positions between the different parties remain as far apart as ever and 
that extra efforts in developing analytical tools, increasing understanding and framing the key 
trade-offs are needed. 
The ECP meeting in Madrid aimed to contribute to these extra efforts in all three areas by 
presenting authoritative background papers and bringing together senior negotiators and policy-
makers with researchers and stakeholders.  
Many interesting ideas and avenues were explored at the ECP seminar in Madrid, as highlighted 
in this Executive Summary. If there is an overall conclusion, it is that a successful conclusion of 
the Copenhagen negotiations in December 2008 will require unequivocal and far-seeing 
leadership by political leaders. The technical complexities and the overarching equity equation 
appear too big to be solved at the level of technical negotiations alone. Such leadership however 
will only come forward if civil society holds its leaders in all parts of the world accountable for 
finding an adequate global solution to climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
The COP-13 negotiations in Bali can be celebrated as a major step and a welcome success. It 
has delivered us a Roadmap, guidelines for negotiating, a two-year deadline for an agreement 
and the earnest involvement of all parties. This is indeed what many observers hoped for as the 
best possible outcome of the COP. 
Yet, at the same time, we have to concede that the Bali consensus was portentously indistinct 
and rather fragile. It included no explicit guidance on a global emissions objective. It referred to 
“commitments” for industrialised countries only coupled with the compromising phrase “or 
actions,” (although we can have faith that most Annex I countries interpret “commitments” in 
the sense of binding reduction requirements). And, on the critical matter of developing country 
actions, Bali was a vital step forward, but it moved the negotiations only as far as the edge of a 
veritable minefield, and it pointed only vaguely in the direction of a way through it.  
That minefield is the phrase “Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country 
Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, 
financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” [1(b)(ii), 
Decision 1/CP.13]. This dry clause embodies the very nexus of contention of the Bali talks. It is 
this clause that brought the negotiations to a tense overtime confrontation that ultimately saw 
the United States’ negotiators reverse an initial position that would have blocked a unanimous 
recognition of historical necessity.
1  
The reason that “technology, financing and capacity-building” are so critical and so contentious 
is that the control of emissions in the South is an undeniable scientific necessity, yet, at the same 
time, the South justifiably takes as its utmost priority its ongoing struggle against poverty. The 
South is thus understandably apprehensive of any climate agreement that would require 
reductions, without at the same time ensuring that those reductions will not impede its 
development. This tension – between the demands of our threatened climate and the 
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development of the South – is at the very centre of the global climate negotiations predicament. 
The loaded clause 1(b)(ii) of the Bali roadmap, in linking reductions in the South to support 
from the North, offers the only plausible resolution of this tension.
2 
2.  A thought experiment 
Figure 1 below illustrates the centrality of this tension to the climate problem. The figure 
conveys a simple ‘thought experiment’ consisting of a bit of science, a bit of conjecture and a 
bit of arithmetic. The red line (‘Global’) in Figure 1 is the science; it shows a global emissions 
trajectory that declines rapidly and deeply enough to preserve a reasonable likelihood of 
keeping the global temperature rise within the widely endorsed 2ºC threshold for maximum 
tolerable warming (Meinshausen, 2006; Baer & Mastrandrea, 2006). Clearly, such a path calls 
for extremely rigorous mitigation, sufficient to force global emissions to peak before 2015 and 
to fall by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.
3 Still, even this ambitious trajectory might 
not be enough. It subjects the earth to a worrisome 15-30% risk of exceeding the 2ºC threshold,
4 
and, recent science suggests that stabilising the climate and avoiding catastrophic climate 
disruption may require an even more stringent course, one sufficient to return emissions 
ultimately to zero (Matthews & Caldeira, 2008) and to stabilise atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
no higher than 350 ppm (Hansen et al., 2008). 
Figure 1. A thought experiment, showing the global emissions budget 
 
                                                      
2 This clause is further strengthened by clause 1(e)(i), which in the context of both mitigation and 
adaptation calls for “Improved access to adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources and 
financial and technical support, and the provision of new and additional resources, including official and 
concessional funding for developing country Parties.” 
3 The trajectory shown includes CO2 only, including approximately 1.5 GtC of emissions from land use in 
non-Annex 1 countries in 2000. The radiative forcing from non-CO2 gases is assumed to decline by about 
50% by mid-century. 
4 In the language of the IPCC, it is “likely”, but not “very likely” to keep warming below 2ºC (IPCC, 
2006; AR4 WGI Chapter 1, Box 1.1, p. 120). 20 | KARTHA, KJELLÉN, BAER & ATHANASIOU 
 
The blue line (‘Annex 1’) in Figure 1 reflects a simple conjecture. It shows the emissions 
trajectory that would result if all Annex 1 countries quickly adopted an ambitious programme 
that forced their emissions to drop to 90% below 1990 levels by 2050, by falling by nearly 6% 
annually from 2010 onwards. It would require intense and concerted effort, and is just barely 
within the bounds of what can be considered politically plausible today. Indeed, it exceeds the 
objectives of even the strictest of the bills now in play in the US Congress (the House of 
Representative’s Safe Climate Act and the Senate’s Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act), 
and the various aspirational targets put forward by EU members states. As such, this line does 
not represent the maximum rate of emissions reductions that may be technically feasible; it is 
merely a reflection of what level of Annex I reductions can be considered politically plausible 
today, though just barely.  
The green line (‘non-Annex 1’) in Figure 1 is the arithmetic. It shows, simply by subtraction, 
what is left of the global budget (red line) after Annex 1 has consumed its indicated proportion 
(blue line). It is, in other words, the remaining space within which non-Annex I countries would 
be constrained to develop, and it is quite bracing. It peaks well before 2020, and is soon racing 
downward at nearly 6% annually. It is this green line that captures the truly daunting nature of 
the climate challenge. It is an ambitious trajectory in any event, but especially so in light of the 
fact that developing countries need to continue to expand energy services in order to meet basic 
development goals (World Bank, 2000; UNDP, 2002; UNDP, 2005). In the less than 15 years 
between now and 2020, incomes in developing countries will hopefully grow substantially; but 
even assuming optimistic growth rates, incomes will still be only one-third of current developed 
country levels on average. In other words, the developing world will still be struggling to 
eradicate endemic poverty, even while its emissions will need to be rapidly declining.
5 
This brings into stark focus the true nature of the climate challenge, and the source of the 
current climate predicament. The climate crisis calls for a regime that can rapidly curb 
emissions globally, without impeding the prospects for developing countries to grow 
economically, expand access to energy services and earnestly combat poverty. In other words, 
what is needed is a climate regime that, by its very design, preserves a right to development. 
Unless a climate regime preserves a right to development, it can not engender the necessary 
scale of developing country engagement, and is therefore not politically or practically feasible. 
One can delineate, in fairly straightforward terms, the threefold objectives that would need to be 
met for a regime to plausibly preserve a right to development. The first objective is of course 
mitigation that is sufficiently rapid and global to avoid dangerous climate change, which itself 
would seriously undermine development. The second objective is adaptation, at a depth and to 
an extent that will keep gains in development from being lost in the face of the climatic changes 
that are now unavoidable. And the third objective – equal in import to the first two – is to 
achieve the first two objectives in a manner that does not itself undermine the development 
aspirations of the poor.  
In other words, this third objective demands that a climate regime that preserves a right to 
development must not impose costs on poor communities and nations nor constrain the 
expansion of energy services in any manner that would impede human development and poverty 
eradication. It is this sentiment, of course, that is the basis of the hard-won agreement in Bali 
                                                      
5 The flexibility in this trajectory is minimal. The North could perhaps cut emissions by even more than 
90% – perhaps 100% – and reduce emissions to zero by 2050, or even earlier, say 2025. But it would not 
change things very significantly, insofar as it would not open up that much more environmental space for 
the South. And, relaxing the red pathway – taking yet greater risks of exceeding 2ºC – only makes a 
difference if it is relaxed so much as to give up on preserving a reasonable likelihood of keeping warming 
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that developing countries would undertake mitigation actions only “in the context of sustainable 
development”, and “supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner”. 
Estimates of total costs for mitigation and adaptation span a wide range, but tend to come out in 
the range of hundreds of billions to perhaps trillions of dollars annually. The following table 
cites some such estimates. 
Table 1. Range of cost estimates for adaptation and mitigation 
Source  Annual cost (billions)  Notes 
Adaptation     
World Bank (2006)  $10-40  Costs to mainstream adaptation in 
development aid 
Oxfam International (2007)  > $50  Costs in developing countries 
UNFCCC Secretariat 
(2007a;2007b) 
$49-171  Adaptation costs in 2030 (summarised in 
Table 65, p. 198) 
UNDP (2007)  $86  Adaptation costs in 2015 
Mitigation     
UNFCCC Secretariat 
(2007a;2007b) 
$380  Costs in 2030 to return emissions to 2007 
levels. (summarised in Table 64, p. 196). 
IPCC AR4 (2007) 
(SPM Table 7.) 
<3%  Costs as percentage of Gross World 
Product in 2030 for stabilising in 445 -535 
ppm CO2eq range.  
Stern (2007)  1% (±3%)  Costs as % of Gross World Product 
through the 2050 for stabilisation in the 
500-550 ppm CO2eq range 
3.  Burden-sharing: What’s on the table? 
One can then ask, what do the various climate regime proposals on the table imply with regard 
to ensuring that national mitigation actions are “supported and enabled by technology, financing 
and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” for developing 
countries from developed countries? To what extent do the various proposals provide 
frameworks within which resources that are “adequate, predictable and sustainable” could flow? 
The first observation to make is that few frameworks explicitly highlight and transparently 
quantify the issue of support from North to South. It is therefore not really possible to do a 
framework-by-framework comparison on consistent and comparable grounds, at least not 
without making numerous additional quantitative assumptions, and some such analyses have 
been attempted (Höhne, 2006, Höhne et al., 2007; den Elzen, 2002). In this section, we will 
simply provide a capsule review of several well-known frameworks with regard to the question 
of international support. In the succeeding section, we elaborate on one of these frameworks – 
the Greenhouse Development Rights framework – with further quantitative detail. 
3.1  Emissions rights approaches 
There are several approaches that are premised on allocating emission allowances based on the 
concept of equitable emission rights. Six of these that are broadly representative of the 
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System, Contraction and Convergence, One Standard/Two Convergence, Common but 
Differentiated Convergence, and the Vattenfall proposal.  
•  Equal Per Capita Emission Rights is a straightforward approach premised on the equal 
rights to the atmospheric commons. All countries would be awarded emission allowances in 
proportion to their population, and would be free to trade them. The total number of 
allowances granted globally would steadily decrease along a path consistent with an agreed 
climate stabilisation goal (Agarwal & Narain, 1995). 
•  Global Climate Certificate System (GCCS) is a variant of a per capita approach, in which 
trades are price controlled, so as to artificially limit the total revenues passing from 
allowance purchasing countries to allowance selling countries (Wicke, 2005). 
•  Contraction and Convergence (C&C) is a hybrid framework combining grandfathered 
emission rights with per capita emission rights, with a gradual transition from the former to 
the latter over a specified number of decades. Countries whose emissions start above the 
global average would receive allowances that gradually trend down to the global average, 
while countries whose emissions start below the global average would receive allowances 
that gradually trend up to the global average (GCI, 2008). 
•  One Standard, Two Convergence is a proposal by Chen et al. (2005), further elaborated by 
Gao (2007) that is based on the principle that countries should have access to equal per 
capita cumulative emissions, in order to allow sufficient space for development. It extends 
the principle of equal per capita emission rights to historic emissions. The name of the 
proposal refers to the fact that when the standard of equal per capita cumulative emissions is 
consistently applied across countries, then developing countries’ emissions will rise above 
the global average (and above the emissions of some developed countries) before 
converging downward. Chen proposed some further adjustments to account for geographic 
circumstances, national energy endowment, economic structure, and international trade.  
•  Common but Differentiated Convergence  (CDC) is a variant of Contraction and 
Convergence, in which nations starting below the global per capita emission level are 
permitted to exceed the global average for a limited time. Also, the poorest developing 
countries are exempt from the emission allowances system (and thus have no excess 
allowances to sell) (Höhne et al., 2006). This proposal reproduces some features of One 
Standard, Two Convergence, without explicitly taking equal per capita cumulative 
emissions as its foundation.  
•  Vattenfall’s proposal is an emission rights proposal premised not on per capita emission 
equality at all, but on per unit of GDP equality. Based on this foundational principle, three 
main modifications are then introduced. First, poorer countries below a specified threshold 
are exempt from the emission allowances system. Second, poor countries above the 
threshold receive a modest ‘cross-subsidy’ of allowances from wealthier countries to 
account for the general observation that poorer countries tend to have higher carbon 
intensity. And third, Annex-1 (but not non- Annex-1) countries have maximum and 
minimum required rates of emission decline (Vattenfall, 2006). 
In all of these frameworks, the primary means through which the “measurable, reportable and 
verifiable” and “adequate, predictable and sustainable” support would flow is the mechanism of 
market-based allowance trading. Countries whose emissions exceeded their allowances would 
purchase allowances from countries whose allowances exceeded their emissions. One key 
question, then, is whether this type of support is adequate, or if further mechanisms would be 
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assistance and capacity-building needed to bring about the transition to a low-carbon economy 
with the necessary adaptation implemented.  
The second key question is whether the scale of support is adequate, i.e., whether the flow of 
allowance revenue would provide sufficient support to enable developing countries to undertake 
the necessary scale of mitigation (and adaptation!) without compromising their development 
efforts. Roughly speaking, the proposals can be ranked in terms of the scale of the allowance 
revenue flow (assuming the same global climate objectives): Equal Per Capita Cumulative 
Emission Rights (One Standard, Two Convergence) leads to the greatest flow of allowance 
revenue, then Equal Per Capita Emission Rights, then CDC, then C&C, and finally Vattenfall’s 
proposal, with the ranking of GCCS among the others depending on details regarding the fixed 
trading price compares to the actual mitigation costs.  
3.2 Multi-stage  proposals 
Multistage proposals categorise countries into different groupings, and assign them qualitatively 
different sorts of commitments. Generally, the richest and highest emitting countries (i.e., those 
with the greatest responsibility and capacity) are assigned the most stringent and legally binding 
commitments (such as emission reduction targets), while the poorest and lowest-emitting 
countries generally have no binding commitments. 
•  Climate Action Network’s “Viable Framework” is a multistage proposal with three tracks, 
to which countries are assigned based on responsibility and capacity. The “Kyoto Track” 
has legally binding reduction commitments, the “Decarbonization Track” has various other 
forms of less rigorous commitments, and the “Adaptation Track” is for key vulnerable 
countries (such as LDCs) that would focus on adaptation. Convergence toward equal per 
capita emission is a stated objective. “Where technical or other assistance is required… this 
needs to be made available from the industrialized countries.” (CAN, 2003). 
•  South-North Proposal is a proposal with six stages, based roughly on responsibility and 
capacity, including OECD countries (with stringent binding targets and requirements to 
provide funding), economies in transition (with binding targets), newly industrialised 
countries (quantified targets and access to partial funding), rapidly industrialising countries 
(quantified targets contingent on funding), other developing countries (non-binding targets 
and partial funding), and LDCs (with nonbinding targets and full funding) (Ott et al., 2004). 
Both of these multistage frameworks explicitly refer to the requirement that technical and 
financial resources would be made available from wealthier countries to enable developing 
countries in certain stages to meet their commitments. Whether these resources are sufficient, 
then, will depend on how the frameworks were actually operationalised, and in particular on the 
criteria upon which graduation from one stage to the next were based (which determines which 
countries are eligible to receive support), and the nature and scale of this support. 
4.  Greenhouse Development Rights 
Here, we examine one specific framework – the Greenhouse Development Rights
6 approach – 
in detail. It has been elaborated in a sufficient degree of detail elsewhere (Baer et al, 2007) that 
it is able to provide some useful indicative results as to what the Bali Roadmap might imply 
                                                      
6 See Baer et al. (2007) for a full explication of the GDR framework. SK, PB, and TA are its developers, 
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with the words “measurable, reportable and verifiable” and “adequate, predictable and 
sustainable”. 
4.1  A ‘development threshold’ 
The GDR framework, starts from a fundamentally different premise than the emission rights 
frameworks. It takes as its central principle the right to development, rather than a right to 
emissions. Emissions are taken as merely instrumental, as having importance only insofar as 
they contribute to development.
7 The right to development, on the other hand, is fundamental. It 
is, as Pan (2005) stressed, a right to a certain level of welfare beyond the mere satisfaction of 
basic needs, but well short of today’s levels of ‘affluent’ consumption.  
At this level of welfare, the GDRs framework defines a ‘development threshold’. Individuals 
below this level are not expected to share the burden of mitigating the climate problem, as they 
have little responsibility for the climate problem and relatively little capacity to invest in solving 
it. Indeed, they have development as their rightful priority, and should not be saddled with the 
costs of keeping society as a whole within the starkly limited global carbon budget. Above the 
development threshold, on the other hand, individuals are expected to help shoulder the burden 
of solving the climate problem, including both the mitigation and adaptation costs. And, the 
further above the threshold, the larger their fair share of the burden. 
The level at which such a development threshold would best be set is a matter for debate, but 
the key principle is clear: it should differentiate the global poor, who have pressing and 
legitimate unmet development needs, from the ‘global consuming class,’ which has reached a 
level of consumption that yields an appreciable contribution to the climate problem, and has 
similarly acquired enough capacity to help bear the costs of managing that problem.  
Consistent with this principle, for the purposes of this indicative calculation, we set the 
development threshold at 125% of a global poverty line. This particular level is, of course, 
somewhat arbitrary, but its appropriateness is supported by the many other contexts in which a 
figure such as 125% of a poverty line is taken to define the upper boundary of ‘exempt’ or 
‘lifeline’ income. These include starting points for income tax calculations, eligibility thresholds 
for social services, and criteria for defining ‘economically vulnerable’ or ‘near-poor’ 
populations. Thus, while it might be an underestimate, it is a plausible and indicative figure, and 
as a valid starting point for discussion. As a global poverty line, one can discard the typical 
figures of $1 per day or $2 per day (World Bank, 1990), as being too low; many people with 
incomes much higher than $2 per day still face pervasive exposure to the plagues of poverty: 
malnutrition, high infant mortality, low educational attainment, high relative food expenditures. 
A defensible global poverty line above which these plagues of poverty are greatly diminished 
can be investigated empirically. The evidence suggests that a global poverty line can reasonably 
be approximated by $16 per day (PPP adjusted),
8 or, equivalently, $6,000 per year (Pritchett, 
                                                      
7 Another approach that takes a development rights perspective is the proposal of Pan Jiahua (2005). 
Several key features that Pan’s proposal shares with the framework presented in this paper will be 
highlighted below.  
8 According to Pritchett (2003) the use of this line ‘is justifiable, more consistent with international 
fairness, and is a better foundation for the World Bank’s organizational mission of poverty reduction.’ 
See also Pritchett (2006). Note, these figures are on a purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted basis, and 
therefore convert to a lower income level in a local developing country currency than if converted at 
market exchange rates. Different development thresholds are explored via a sensitivity analysis in Baer et 
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2003; 2006). Taking this figure as a global poverty line, we then have (multiplying by 125%) an 
indicative development threshold of $7,500 a year (PPP).  
4.2 Burden-sharing 
Having defined a development threshold, we can then define a consistent burden-sharing 
system, and use it to make an indicative calculation of national obligations under a climate 
regime. This allows one to examine in an explicit and quantitative manner the question of the 
international support raised by the aforementioned clauses 1(b)ii and 1(e)i in the Bali roadmap.  
The GDR framework is based on the same two principles that underlie the UNFCCC: capacity 
and responsibility. The idea that burden sharing should be based on a systematic treatment of 
responsibility and capacity is reflected in most if not all contemporary burden sharing proposals.  
Capacity in this context means having the financial resources to deal with the climate problem 
without sacrificing necessities. We calculate it as the aggregate sum of individual income in 
excess of the development threshold, summed across all the individuals in a country. Figure 2 
illustrates this calculation for three countries: India, China, and the US. It shows the income 
distribution for each country, estimated on the basis of national per capita income and Gini 
coefficient (a measure of national income inequality).
9 These charts array each person along the 
X-axis from poorest (on the left) to wealthiest (on the right), and plots their (PPP adjusted) 
income. The development threshold at $7,500 is shown, cutting through each country’s income 
distribution curve and thus dividing total national income into a fraction (yellow) below the 
development threshold, and a fraction (green) that the wealthier portion of the population earns 
in excess of the development threshold. The green area thus graphically reflects our estimate of 
each country’s capacity. As it turns out, nearly 7% of India’s population earns more than 
$7,500. These are the members of that burgeoning ‘Indian middle class’ that has so captured the 
attention of the media. In terms of sheer numbers, they comprise a large and growing 
consuming class, one that is roughly the size of the population of the consuming class in, say, 
the UK or France.
10 But this is there where the similarity ends. For these Indian consumers have 
a much lower aggregate income, and the amount of India’s income in excess of the $7,500 
development threshold is less than one-sixth as large. 
Similar observations can be made about the approximately 27% of China’s population that 
comprises its consuming class, which is as large as the US population, nearly all of which is 
above the development threshold. However, China’s income above the development threshold is 
less than one-sixth of that of the US.  
                                                      
9 We approximate the national income distributions as lognormal distribution using two country-specific 
parameters: the mean per capita income and the Gini coefficient. To provide results that are more relevant 
to a burden-sharing arrangement agreed in the near future, we based our calculations on incomes, 
populations, etc. that are the projected values in 2010. The charts have been scaled so that the length of 
the x-axis is proportional to population, and thus the areas of the different sections – e.g., the green 
section representing capacity – can be directly compared in absolute terms. For a full explanation, see the 
technical appendix in Baer, Kartha, Athanasiou (2007), although note that the calculations here have been 
updated using World Bank PPP income data released in 2008. 
10 This estimate is consistent with those produced by other analyses, e.g., NCAER (2005) and McKinsey 
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Figure 2. Capacity 
 
Note: The curves are income distributions for India, China and the US, with the green area representing income 
above the $7,500 (PPP) development threshold, or national ‘capacity’. 
Responsibility, of course, is the central concept behind the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and is 
interpreted in terms of the greenhouse gases that nations have cumulatively contributed to the 
atmosphere. We define and calculate responsibility in a manner precisely analogous to capacity, 
i.e., with respect to the development threshold. Specifically, we calculate a country’s 
responsibility as cumulative emissions excluding emissions corresponding to consumption 
below the development threshold. This definition is a recognition of the distinction between 
emissions arising from meeting basic needs, and emissions corresponding to discretionary 
consumption, and reflects the premise that these different types of emissions are of 
fundamentally different natures: in essence, basic emissions do not imply responsibility, 
whereas discretionary consumption does. It thus preserves a right to development insofar as it 
allows people to strive toward the development threshold unencumbered by the need to meet 
emissions constraints. (Note, there are indeed emissions constraints, and these must be met, but 
not at the expense of those below the development threshold.) 
A detailed calculation of emissions by income class for each country is beyond the scope of our 
analysis, although it is possible and such analyses have indeed been done for some countries 
(See, for example, Metcalf, 2007 for the US, Brenner et al., 2007) for China, and 
Ananthapadmanabhan et al., 2007, for India). We make the simplifying assumption that (within 
any given country) emissions are proportional to consumption, which is in turn proportional to 
income.
11 One can then straightforwardly generate national responsibility graph analogous to 
the Figure 2 graphs of national capacity. To show more countries, however, we present in 
Figure 3 a condensed graph that shows several nations and regions, with the total height of each 
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bar reflecting the cumulative emissions since 1990. The yellow portion shows the emissions 
corresponding to consumption below the development threshold, and the green portion the 
aggregate responsibility. (These are analogous to the yellow and green portions of the graphs in 
Figure 2, except that they are not presented as a full distribution across the national 
populations.) Although our indicative calculation of responsibility takes 1990 as the start year, 
one can certainly argue that an earlier start year would be more appropriate. All things being 
equal, it would increase the relative responsibility of the Annex-1 nations, which began the 
process of industrialisation much earlier, compared to non- Annex- 1 nations.  
Capacity and responsibility can now be combined in a straightforward way to yield a combined 
indicator that can be used as the basis of a burden sharing allocation. We refer to this as a 
“Responsibility-Capacity Indicator” or RCI,
12 which amounts in essence to a progressive 
income/emissions tax. (Pan suggests a structurally similar approach, based on a “basic needs 
threshold” and a progressive emissions tax above the threshold. Not coincidentally, his detailed 
bottom-up calculation for a basic needs threshold for China which comes out very similar to the 
emissions level implied by our development threshold.) 
Figure 3. Responsibility 
 
Note:  The total height of each bar gives the cumulative emissions since 1990, the yellow portion is the 
emissions corresponding to consumption below the development threshold, and the green portion is 
emissions corresponding to consumption above the development threshold, or national ‘responsibility’. 
                                                      
12 The RCI is constructed in a simple and generic manner that allows responsibility and capacity to be 
weighted differently: RCI = R 
a • C 
b . The exponents a and b sum to 1, so that, as the paired weights go 
from a=1 and b=0 at one extreme to a=0 and b=1 at the other, the RCI goes from being exactly equal to 
responsibility (R) to being exactly equal to capacity (C). In our reference calculations we set a = 0.4 and b 
= 0.6, which is to say that we weigh capacity somewhat higher than responsibility. Again, this choice is 
subject to discussion. A different weighting, will not change the results dramatically. 28 | KARTHA, KJELLÉN, BAER & ATHANASIOU 
 
It is worth stressing here that this burden-sharing framework allocates obligations at the national 
level, but that it derives these from information at the intra-national level regarding the 
distribution of wealth and emissions. As emphasised by Pan (2005), this need to look at intra-
national disparities is a logical consequence of the premise that a viable climate regime must 
preserve a right to development, which is itself a right that adheres to individuals, not to 
countries. 
5. Results 
The results are not altogether surprising, as shown in Table 2 for a representative set of 
countries and regions. The US has slightly less than one third of the total global obligation (see 
rightmost column labelled “Obligation”), the EU27 has a bit less than one quarter, China has 
less than 7%, and India a fairly trivial 0.8%. While we have made various specific assumptions 
in generating this indicative quantification (e.g., setting the development threshold at $7,500 
(PPP), and choosing 1990 as the start year for calculating responsibility) we argue that any 
system that quantifies responsibility and capacity in a manner that is premised on the need to 
preserve a right to development, will not yield dramatically differing results.
13  
Table 2. Global shares of population, income, capacity, cumulative emissions, responsibility, 
and obligation (RCI) for selected countries and groups of countries (%) 
  Population  Income  Capacity  Cumulative 
emissions 
(1990-2010) 
Responsibility  Obligation 
(RCI) 
Annex 1  18.8  57.2  75.1  56.5  73.4  74.6 
Non-Annex 1  81.2  42.8  24.9  43.5  26.7  25.4 
United States  4.6  20.7  29.7  23.3  33.9  31.8 
EU (27)  7.2  21.6  27.9  15.9  20.5  24.8 
United Kingdom  0.9  3.1  4.2  2.1  2.9  3.7 
Germany  1.2  4.1  5.6  3.4  4.6  5.2 
Russia 2.0  3.2  2.9  6.3  5.9  3.9 
Brazil  2.9  2.8  2.3  1.4  1.2  1.8 
China 19.7  12.5  5.9  15.7  7.5  6.6 
India  17.2  5.2  0.8  4.2  0.7  0.8 
South Africa  0.7  0.7  0.6  1.6  1.4  0.9 
LDCs  12.5  1.5  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.1 
All high income   15.1  55.2  75.6  50.9  71.4  74.3 
All middle income  46.7  36.4  23.4  42.2  27.8  24.8 
All low income  38.2  8.5  1.0  6.9  0.9  0.9 
World  100  100  100%  100  100%  100% 
 
These results help illustrate what might be implied by the phrases “measurable, reportable and 
verifiable” and “adequate, predictable and sustainable” international support. Each party’s 
national obligation would amount to its share of the global obligation (rightmost column above) 
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times the global total cost of adaptation and mitigation (see Table 1 for indicative total global 
costs). These calculations of national obligation explicitly account for the wealth and poverty in 
each country. They reflect the presence in each country (each Annex-I country, China, even 
India) of a sub-population that is part of the global consuming class and that rightfully has 
obligations under an international climate regime. They also reflect the presence in each country 
of individuals (for many developing countries the this is the majority) who have not yet attained 
a decent standard of living, and who thus contribute nothing to their country’s obligations.  
6. Implications 
It is possible to look more closely at the concrete political implications of this burden-sharing 
framework, by expressing it in the familiar language of national emission reduction 
commitments. We can do this by considering the total volume of mitigation required globally, 
and allocating it to countries in accordance with their share of the global obligation (as shown in 
Table 2). The global mitigation requirement is defined as the volume of emission reductions 
needed to fully shift from a business-as-usual scenario, for which we take the recent World 
Energy Outlook 2007 global energy scenario (IEA, 2007), to the 2ºC mitigation path (the red 
line) presented in Figure 1. We show this graphically in Figure 4, where the topmost line (the 
one rising above 12 GtC per year in 2025) is the WEO business-as-usual emission trajectory, the 
bottommost line is the same 2ºC mitigation path presented as the red line in Figure 1.  
We first note the green wedge, labelled ‘No-Regrets’, which is an estimate of the negative- and 
zero-cost emissions reductions available globally.
14 The green wedge, in other words, represents 
free and profitable reductions – such as cost-effective energy efficiency – which are large, 
though not by any means large enough to bring emissions all the way down to the 2ºC path. 
From the perspective of a global burden sharing framework, these reductions should be treated 
differently from positive-cost options. Because countries can in principle exploit these 
opportunities to their benefit, one might argue that all nations should be responsible for 
capturing their own no-regrets reductions, and that only further reductions – those that actually 
have positive costs – should be considered part of the global mitigation requirement to be 
allocated among nations within the broader burden-sharing framework.  
However, in practice, one cannot ignore the barriers preventing countries from achieving all 
their no-regrets reductions. These barriers are broad and high, and encompass structural, 
institutional, technological – and even financial – obstacles to otherwise cost-effective options. 
And while some no-regrets options might face barriers that can be overcome domestically, for 
example through institutional changes and policy reform, others face barriers that might well be 
insurmountable without external assistance such as concessionary financing and technological 
cooperation. Recognising these two fundamentally different cases, the GDRs framework obliges 
developing countries to only achieve the more accessible fraction of their no-regrets options, 
and folds the remainder into the global burden-sharing arrangement. The precise fraction of any 
country’s no-regrets opportunities that might plausibly be achieved through domestic efforts 
will have to be determined on a country-by-country basis, in a manner that reflects differing 
national circumstances. For the purposes of our indicative analysis, we crudely estimate that the 
more accessible no-regrets opportunities amount to 50% of the total for non-Annex 1 countries. 
These are included in their national reference trajectories, and the remainder are added to the 
global mitigation requirement. (For Annex 1 countries, 100% of the estimated no-regrets 
opportunities are included in the national reference trajectories.) This apportioning of the no-
regrets opportunities is reflected in Figure 4. 
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The global mitigation gap is allocated to nations according to their proportion of global 
obligation
15 (as shown in Table 2). Accordingly, the US reduction obligation amounts to 
approximately 32% of the mitigation gap (the red wedge); the EU’s is 25% (purple); China just 
under 7% (blue); and India less than 1% (yellow, barely visible).  
Figure 4. Global mitigation requirement, divided into ‘reduction obligation’ wedges that reflect 
national / regional shares of RCI 
 
 
The implications of this burden sharing allocation are best revealed by ‘zooming in’ on 
individual countries. Doing this, it becomes evident that using the quite reasonable assumptions 
modelled in this study, wealthy and high emitting countries will very quickly come to have 
emissions reductions obligations that are larger than their projected domestic emissions. We 
demonstrate this with the case of the US.  
Figure 5 shows the US business-as-usual path, along with three wedges of reductions. The first 
is the green wedge, which corresponds to the no-regrets reduction opportunities available in the 
US, which it is required to aggressively exploit. The other two wedges (the dark blue and light 
blue) together comprise the US’ reduction obligation shown in Figure 4 (the red wedge equal to 
                                                      
15 It is worth noting that this general approach is not novel. It is a direct descendent of the so-called 
‘Brazilian Proposal’, although in that case national percentage shares of a global mitigation objective 
were to be divided among the Annex I countries alone, in proportion to their contribution to global 
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32% of the global mitigation gap). The US’ reduction obligation is divided into these two 
wedges to represent the fact that the US would choose to discharge some of its mitigation 
obligation through reductions domestically, and others would be undertaken internationally. The 
GDRs framework makes no intrinsic assumptions about the relative proportion of domestic 
reductions  and  international reductions that a country will choose in seeking to fulfil its 
mitigation obligations. With international purchases managed via a global cap and allocate 
system, say, a country would, at least in theory, be free to make any portion of its reductions 
domestically, and the remainder internationally, based on any nationally salient economic or 
political considerations. What is clear and striking is that even assuming very ambitious 
domestic reductions (about 6% annually, corresponding to a path heading toward 90% 
reductions by 2050, as shown by the red line in Figure 1), there is a need for substantial 
international emissions reductions concurrently. 
Figure 5. US allocation, showing no-regrets reductions (green), domestically discharged 
reduction obligation (dark blue), and internationally discharged reduction obligation 
(light blue). 
 
 
The developing country complement to the situations illustrated in Figure 5 is well illustrated by 
the case of China, shown in Figure 6. Again, the top path corresponds to China’s business-as-
usual path, and the green wedge to a portion of its no-regrets opportunities. The dark blue 
wedge corresponds to China’s reduction obligation, (about 7% of the global mitigation 
requirement). The large light blue wedge shows a large additional set of emissions reductions 
made within China, but financed by countries (such as the US) seeking to discharge their own 
reduction obligations. The light blue wedge is, in essence, the converse of the light blue wedge 
shown in Figure 5. 
These reductions are a natural and expected outcome of the GDRs framework, and a necessary 
feature of any climate regime that can possibly solve the climate problem. China’s emissions are 
large, and fully exploiting its mitigation potential is essential if we’re to keep within the 
emergency 2ºC trajectory. Recalling Figure 1, we reiterate that aggressive mitigation in the 32 | KARTHA, KJELLÉN, BAER & ATHANASIOU 
 
South is a scientific necessity, but will only occur if it doesn’t conflict with the South’s urgent 
development needs.  
Figure 6. China allocation, showing no-regrets reductions (green), reduction obligation (dark 
blue), and further reductions supported and enabled by countries whose reduction 
obligations exceed their domestic mitigation potential (light blue). 
 
 
7.  Institutions and mechanisms 
Though we have illustrated above the implications of a GDRs allocation operationalised as a 
trading system, this is just a simplified example. In reality, much remains to be determined 
about how countries would actually pay their bills, or how their payments would be 
productively directed toward their objectives. Adaptation presents even greater challenges in 
this regard than mitigation.  
The only thing that can be said for sure is that the scale and nature of the required financial 
assistance and technological cooperation is unprecedented, and that it will call for the expansion 
of existing institutions and mechanisms, as well as the creation of new ones that have not yet 
even been envisaged. Some of the adaptation funding could presumably be linked to 
conventional ODA, though not all of it. And some of the mitigation funding could presumably 
flow through market-based mechanisms like today’s carbon trading systems, though not all of it. 
Any number of schemes might be called upon: progressive carbon and income taxes, trade-
related levies, sectoral agreements, IPR concessions and so on. Beyond these, new as-yet 
unnamed channels for both international resource transfer and accounting would need to be 
conceived and implemented, inevitably posing an impressive set of challenges: how to scale-up? 
How to build absorptive capacity? How to ensure efficiency and avoid waste? How to institute 
credible governance? 
These questions and others will be hotly debated, and this analysis provides no answers. Suffice 
it to say that the problems here are inadequately understood and extremely daunting, and that 
they are faced by the GDRs approach alone. In fact, they are shared by any climate regime that LINKING MRV MITIGATION ACTIONS TO MRV TECHNICAL SUPPORT | 33 
 
purports to actually do something meaningful about mitigation and adaptation. In any case, the 
intention of this analysis is simply to draw attention to the enormity of the international 
cooperation that the climate problem demands, and to the magnitude of the financial assistance 
and technological cooperation that it implies for each country. By so doing, our hope is that a 
new discussion about international mechanisms can begin, one that is in line with the scale of 
the actual challenge.  
8. Final  Comments 
The scientific evidence is bracing and demands a break with ‘politics as usual’. The rapid rate at 
which reductions are needed globally means that carbon-based growth is no longer an option, 
neither in the North nor the South, and our response to the climate crisis must recognise that and 
make the alternative a reality.  
A major commitment to large North-to-South assistance – financial and technological – is an 
inevitable part of that reality, as was agreed in Bali and codified in para 1 (b) ii of Decision 
1/CP.13. Domestic reductions by the developed world, in other words, fulfil only part of its 
obligation. To be sure, the environmental community – and increasingly other stakeholders such 
as the private sector, civil society and forward thinking politicians – have done a spectacular job 
of putting the need for real domestic emission reductions onto the political agenda. But there’s 
been precious little attention given to the underlying structure of the global climate-development 
problem, and to the consequent international responsibility of the industrialised countries to 
enable a rapid transition to a low-carbon world.  
This will require a fundamental rethinking of many issues, be they political, social or economic. 
However, societies both in the North and in the South have grown accustomed to rather rapid 
and radical structural change in the past, and will certainly be able to do so also in the future. 
This is all the more important, since national societal enabling conditions are required to 
formulate negotiation instructions that will lead to robust and implementable international 
agreements. 
For political reasons, if not for ethical reasons, a commitment from the wealthy of the South is 
also necessary. It unlikely that the working consensus to pay a large proportion of the total 
mitigation and adaptation costs could ever emerge in the North if the ‘wealthy’ minority among 
the Indian and Chinese populous were not also paying their ‘fair shares’. 
One can certainly ask whether such a framework, which makes the daunting climate challenge 
even more overwhelming by conflating it with developmental equity, is at all politically 
realistic. Well, as has been said by many others, the outer bounds of what is politically realistic 
today is far shy of the inner bounds of what is scientifically necessary. Political realism is rather 
labile, and it is much more likely that political realism will redefine itself (as climate impacts 
become more acutely felt) than that the science will fundamentally change. It is obvious that 
without an unprecedented level of global cooperation, an emergency programme simply cannot 
be implemented. The alternative to a solution along these lines is probably a weak regime with 
little chance of preventing catastrophic climate change.  
This will require a fundamental rethinking of many issues, be they political, social, or economic. 
However, as Einstein said, “The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level 
of thinking we were at when we created them.” Indeed, societies both in the North and in the 
South have undergone rather rapid and radical changes many times, and will certainly be able to 
do so also in the future. Indeed, the negotiators whom we are tasking with the design of a viable 
and effective climate regime can only reasonably be expected to succeed if the necessary 
societal enabling conditions have been put in place (Kjellén, 2008).  34 | KARTHA, KJELLÉN, BAER & ATHANASIOU 
 
Since efforts will be demanded of all of us, fairness, equity and justice, real and perceived, are 
essential prerequisites for success. But the core of the issue is about politics. As nicely as a right 
to development may accord with one’s innate sense of justice, this is really a matter of hard-
nosed politics. Climate change is a problem ...perhaps humankind's first problem of this kind; 
where poor and wealthy begin to understand that we all share a small planet and that we are all 
interdependent. It also gives a new dimension to the word solidarity: the survival of the wealthy 
depends on their solidarity with the poor. And intra-generational equity is a necessity for the 
inter-generational equity we are striving for. We are all responsible, but the responsibility is 
indeed differentiated. The climate regime ultimately has to ensure the rights of the billions of 
people far away from the conference halls: the unseen poor of the planet today, and the unborn, 
future generations. Therefore, in order to ensure our common survival through success in 
extremely difficult negotiations, the North will have to engage with the South in a way that 
recognises and honours its entirely legitimate development needs on this shared, finite planet. 
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Abstract  
The IPCC and the Bali Action Plan emphasize the urgent need to cut global Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG) emissions. Global agreement to limit GHG emissions is a formidable task. Therefore, 
novel ways of involving different groups and Parties need to be identified and deliberated upon. 
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1.  The climate change challenge and the need for action  
The Bali Action Plan adopted during COP13 endorsed deep cuts in global emissions to achieve 
the ultimate objective of the Convention and emphasised the urgency to address climate change. 
The task of designing and successfully negotiating an agreement that will deliver these 
reductions is a formidable one. It seems clear that novel ways of thinking are needed in order to 
facilitate this process. This paper discusses how an approach based on reviews of specific 
mitigation options and the associated barriers to implementation may provide a common ground 
for negotiating parties and a more effective climate regime. 
Proposals for coordinated international action on climate change can be divided into two broad 
categories: top-down approaches and bottom-up approaches. Top-down approaches, with the 
Kyoto Protocol being perhaps the most prominent example, impose greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions targets on a Party level and leave the details of implementation to the countries 
themselves. In contrast, bottom-up approaches focus on creating and designing (the right) 
incentives for concrete actions, mainly but not exclusively, at country level, in an internationally 
coordinated way.  
New energy infrastructure investments in developing countries, upgrades of energy 
infrastructure in industrialised countries and policies that promote energy security can, in many 
cases, create opportunities to achieve GHG emission reductions. A bottom-up approach will 
ensure efficient utilisation of energy and resources in the infrastructure being added in 
developing countries along with addressing environment and climate change issues. The 
developing countries may be wary of a restraint on economic growth as a result of a top-down 
approach.  
This paper discusses how a bottom-up approach to an international climate agreement may 
provide better incentives for India to engage in such a global agreement to combat climate 
change. The basic rationale is that such an approach could offer better opportunities to ensure 
that the mechanisms of the agreement are aligned with the priorities and at the country level in 
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India. The paper has three sections. First, we briefly outline the economic status and trends in 
India. Second, we show the range of mitigation options at different cost levels in India, 
including the primary barriers and drivers for realising these options. Finally, we discuss what 
policies are required to overcome the barriers, and which parts of an international policy regime 
are particularly important in this context.  
2.  Status and trend of economic development and energy use in India 
Energy is a prime mover of economic growth and development. This is critically important for 
developing countries like India, where economic development is on the rise. Simultaneously 
providing adequate and equitable access to basic amenities and services is the immediate 
priority of the policy-makers of the country. Energy will also be required to meet the targets set 
by these countries under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for improving the 
condition of the world’s poorest by 2015. Therefore, only economic development can provide a 
lasting solution to address the problems of the country.  
Economic reforms, implemented by successive governments over the past two decades, 
particularly since 1991, have resulted in the Indian economy maturing in several important 
respects and integrating much more with the world economy. India has experienced impressive 
growth rates in the recent past with a GDP growth rate of 9.0% and 9.2% in 2005-06 and 2006-
07, respectively.
1 While this performance reflects the strength of the economy in many areas, it 
is also true that large parts of the population of India are yet to experience a decisive 
improvement in their standards of living. For example, around 44% of the households in India 
do not have access to electricity.
2 
Realising the fact that the future social and economic development of the nation is premised on 
achieving a high rate of economic growth delivered with equity and social justice, the 
Government of India in its Approach Paper to the Eleventh Five-Year Plan has set several 
monitorable targets to bring about a general improvement in living conditions of its citizens. 
The approach paper also emphasises that rapid economic growth has to be an essential part of 
the country’s strategy.
3 
The positive relationship between energy requirements and human development is well 
recognised. Figure 1 supports the relationship between human development and energy 
consumption from the empirical relationship between Human Development Indicator (HDI) and 
energy consumption for different countries.
4 Over the years, India has made substantial progress 
in social welfare with the HDI increasing from 0.515, in year 1990 to 0.619 in year 2005.
5 
However, the 128
th position of India in the HDI list reiterates the fact that country has to move 
upward significantly in human development.  
                                                      
1 MoF (2007), Economic survey 2006-07, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi. 
2 Census of India (2001), Final population: 2001 Census, Office of the Registrar General, New Delhi. 
3 Planning Commission (2006), Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth: An Approach to the 11th 
Five Year Plan, Government of India, New Delhi. 
4 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2007), Human Development Report 2007/08, 
UNDP, New York, 2007 and IEA (International Energy Agency), CO2 emissions from fuel combustion: 
Highlights (1971-2005), IEA, Paris. 
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Figure 1. Human development index and per capita energy consumption (for year 2005) 
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Growth in the Indian economy and consequently in the country’s energy requirements is 
increasingly being seen as an important element in the future global energy scenario. At present, 
India ranks fifth in the world in terms of primary commercial energy consumption, accounting 
for about 3.9% of the world’s commercial energy demand in 2006.
6 However, despite the 
overall increase in energy demand, per capita commercial energy consumption in India is still 
very low compared to other developed and major developing countries.
7 Furthermore, past trend 
shows that the energy intensity of economy is reducing continuously (Figure 2).
8 
                                                      
6 BP (British Petroleum) (2007), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007 (available at 
www.bp.com/statisticalreview). 
7 IEA (2007). 
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Figure 2. Time trend of primary energy supply and energy intensity in India 
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Latest commercial energy balance for India shows that coal is the highest contributor to the 
commercial energy supply followed by oil. During the year 2005-06 coal contributed for 53% of 
total commercial energy supply while oil had a share of 35% in the total commercial energy 
supply in the same year.
9 At the end use side, among all energy consuming sectors the industry 
sector remains the highest energy consumer followed by transport and residential sector. During 
the year 2004-05, the industry sector accounted for 44%, transport sector 17% and residential 
sector 14% of the final commercial energy use.
10 
Literature reveals that no country has substantially reduced poverty without massively 
increasing its use of energy.
11 Electricity, in particular, plays a crucial role in improving levels 
of human development and quality of modern life.
12 Given the strong correlation between 
economic activity and growth in energy and infrastructure, it is evident that energy requirements 
of the country would increase rapidly. The challenge facing India is to meet its energy needs in 
a sustainable manner.
13 This would require an introspection of energy conservation and energy 
efficiency improvement across different sectors. In order to promote the potential opportunities 
under different sectors, opportunities presented by the multi-lateral environmental agreements, 
                                                      
9 TERI (The Energy and Resources Institute) (2008), TERI Energy Data Directory and Yearbook 2007, 
TERI, New Delhi. 
10 Ibid. 
11 ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2007), Energy for All: addressing the energy, environment, and 
poverty nexus in Asia, ADB, Manila. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Planning Commission (2006), Report of the Expert Committee on Integrated Energy Policy, 
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Mitigation 
potential 
particularly the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) should 
be explored. 
3.  Potential mitigation opportunities – options and issues 
As brought out in the previous section, energy requirements of the country will go up in order to 
meet the human development and poverty eradication goals. This would also mean an 
associated increase in the country’s GHG emissions. It becomes very important for India not to 
ape the models of development adopted by the industrialised countries in the past but to follow a 
sustainable development pathway and keep its emissions controlled while continuing with its 
developmental priorities. 
According to the first national communication of India to the UNFCCC, the aggregate 
emissions from the anthropogenic activities amounted to 1229 million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent.
14 On a sectoral basis the energy sector accounted for about 61%, agriculture 28%, 
industrial process 8%, waste disposal 2% and land use and land use change 1%.
15 The base year 
for the first national communication had been 1994 and since then the economy has expanded 
tremendously resulting into many-fold energy demand and GHG emissions. 
Various sectors of the Indian economy present opportunities for emissions reductions and the 
table below presents a list of such options. The drivers behind these options presently are other 
than climate change, namely energy conservation, energy efficiency improvement, etc., 
motivated primarily by energy security and energy prices concerns. However, keeping in view 
the challenges of climate change and the need for significant emissions reductions by all the 
countries as recognised by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Bali 
Action Plan, it becomes important that these opportunities are up-scaled several fold and with 
climate change as the prime driver. The necessary resources for these options could be explored 
under the mechanisms and framework provided through the multilateral environmental 
agreements, including the UNFCCC. Table 1 below presents a quick listing of such options in 
the power, industry, transport, and residential and commercial sectors. The table also presents a 
broad potential of their contribution to addressing climate change as well as their cost 
categories.  
Table 1. Mitigation potential versus costs 
 Low 
 
 
 
Medium High 
Low  
 
Super critical 
Advanced gas 
turbine 
R & M 
Small hydro 
Labelling of 
consumer 
appliances 
Green buildings 
Industrial energy efficiency 
Transport sector interventions (public 
transport, road to rail & efficiency 
improvement) 
Efficient lighting 
Medium  Renewable 
energy options 
Ultra super critical 
power plants 
 
High 
 
 Hybrid  vehicle  for 
city transport 
IGCC 
CCS 
Hydrogen-based IC engine for transport 
                                                      
14 MoEF (Ministry of Environment and Forests) (2004), India’s Initial National Communication to the 
UNFCCC, MoEF, Government of India, New Delhi. 
15 Ibid. 
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In Tables 2-4 these opportunities have been further categorised into negative or zero-cost 
options, low-cost options and high-cost options. The cost estimates are based on the ball park 
numbers available in secondary literature that are primarily based on the average cost data and 
test bench efficiency figures. In reality, cost figures may vary from project to project, and 
energy efficiency may also vary depending upon several other influencing factors. In addition to 
these opportunities, there could be certain high-end technologies such as Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) based on domestic coal, carbon capture and storage (CCS), hydrogen 
based IC (Internal Combustion) engines and hybrid vehicles for transport. The table also 
captures the issues in the adoption/implementation of these options. 
Table 2. Mitigation analysis for India: Negative or zero cost options 
Option  Barriers  Drivers 
Power 
 
R&M of old plant 
 
 
 
Advanced gas turbine 
 
Coal super critical 
 
 
Technical limitation to improve 
efficiency, Financially sick state utilities, 
opportunity cost of capital, financing 
 
Availability of technology 
 
High initial cost, confidence on 
technology 
 
 
Energy security 
air quality 
improvement/health 
Transport 
Shift from personalised transport 
to public transport  
 
Shift from road to rail for freight 
and passenger transportation  
 
Efficiency improvement in road 
transport 
 
High investment, myopic urban planning 
 
 
High investment, stressed infrastructure 
 
 
Lack of efficiency standard and huge 
investment required for improvement in 
road infrastructure 
 
Air quality 
improvement/health, 
reduction of urban 
congestion, access 
to transport services, 
connectivity, energy 
security 
Residential & commercial sector 
Efficient lighting (CFL, electronic 
chokes, etc.) 
 
Labelling of appliances 
 
Energy-efficient building 
 
High initial cost, consumer confidence, 
performance, quality of power 
 
New initiative, awareness  
 
Know-how, mindsets, applicable only in 
new buildings, building construction and 
facility management are done by separate 
entities 
 
Energy (bill) 
savings, energy 
security, 
Industries 
Industrial energy-efficiency 
improvement  
 
 
Higher share of fly ash and blast 
furnace slag blended cement 
 
Higher share of Natural Gas based 
ammonia production 
 
Opportunity cost of capital, know-how at 
small-scale level capital constraints, 
variety of raw materials and products 
 
Limited applicability, high transport cost 
of fly ash and slag 
 
Natural gas availability 
 
Energy (bill) 
savings increase in 
productivity and 
economic 
competitiveness 
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Table 3. Mitigation analysis for India: Low-cost options (<$10/tCO2) 
Option  Barriers  Drivers 
Power 
Coal ultra-supercritical 
 
 
Access to technology, high 
capital cost, confidence in 
project developer (only 24 plants 
operating globally) 
Energy security 
Air quality improvement / health 
Renewables 
Small hydro 
 
Dispersed (maintenance 
problems), limited potential 
 
Access to energy services, 
quality of life, economic 
development 
Industries 
Cogeneration in cement plant 
 
 
 
Efficiency improvement in 
Industries* 
 
High capital cost, opportunity 
cost of capital, lower technical 
capability in small plants 
 
High upfront cost of technology, 
large capacity plant 
 
Energy (bill) savings 
Increase in productivity and 
economic competitiveness 
* Within the category of industrial energy efficiency, there are a large number of technological options ranging 
from negative to low-cost categories. 
Table 4. Mitigation analysis for India: High cost options (>$10/tCO2) 
Option  Barriers  Drivers 
Power 
IGCC – imported coal 
High capital cost, forex burden, confidence 
(only around 10 plants operating world wide), 
adoption of the Indian condition 
Energy security 
Air quality 
improvement / health 
Renewables 
Biomass gasifier 
Solar PV 
Wind 
 
High capital cost, O&M 
suitable technology development, limited 
potential 
 
Quality of life, 
economic 
development 
Transport 
Biodiesel 
Land availability, competition with food 
crops, penetration, cost, procurement policy, 
involvement of oil companies 
Air quality 
improvement / health 
Energy security 
High-end technologies 
IGCC – domestic coal 
 
 
CCS 
 
 
Hydrogen-based IC engine 
for transport 
 
Hybrid vehicle for city 
transport 
 
High ash content of the Indian coal, tech 
development, R&D cost, high capital cost 
 
High capital and O&M costs, info on storage 
sites, confidence level  
 
High cost, hydrogen production, storage, 
transport, safety 
 
Nascent technology 
 
Energy security, air 
quality improvement / 
health 
 
 
 
Energy saving, 
competitiveness 
 
Almost all the options listed in Table 2 are happening in India, although keeping in view the 
large size of the country, the resulting impacts are much smaller. With increased awareness 
about energy security, environment and climate change, the activities have picked up recently 
and are expected to increase further. With appropriate enabling environments by the 
government of India, investment frameworks and international mechanisms, deployment of 
these options could be accelerated and large-scale benefit could be achieved. It is also perceived 
that successful implementation of these options in India would also trigger upscaling 
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For example, in the power sector, the government of India has a massive plan for renovation and 
modernisation of old power plants for their efficiency improvement. However, certain state 
utilities are not able to implement this option at a fast pace due to their poor financial condition. 
Similarly for deployment of super critical coal power plants, the Ultra Mega Power Projects 
(UMPPs) were announced by the Ministry of Power in early 2006. These UMPPs have been 
conceptualised with the aim of developing large generation projects. Under this policy, projects 
of 4000 MW would be developed on a Build Own and Operate (BOO) basis at each of the 
identified locations to ensure economies of scale. This had immense impact on the power sector 
as almost three-fourth of the total coal-based capacity addition during the twelfth five-year plan 
period (2012-2016) is proposed to be through this super critical technology. It is expected that 
India will be able to develop indigenous advanced gas turbine technology by 2012. 
In the transport sector the National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) of the Government of India 
seeks to encourage integrated land use and transport planning in cities, and focuses on greater 
use of public transport. The metro projects have been initiated for a number of cities in India. 
NUTP incorporates urban transportation as an important parameter at the urban planning stage. 
While presenting the rail budget for the year 2008-09, the Minister of Railways emphasised 
increasing the share of railways in freight traffic by augmenting the capacity on high-density 
corridors to meet the growth in freight traffic, promoting greater multi-modalism as a means of 
integrating with competing modes, increasing railway productivity through improved signalling, 
synchronisation, etc. However, these interventions would require huge investment and 
integrated urban planning. 
With regard to efficiency improvement in the road transport sector, the National Auto Fuel 
Policy 2003 provides a roadmap for achieving various vehicular emissions norms over a period 
of time and the corresponding fuel quality upgrading requirements. All India Bharat Stage II 
and Bharat Stage III are similar to Euro II and III norms, respectively. This resulted in major 
investment to be made by fuel suppliers and auto manufacturers. The efficiency standards are 
indirectly related to fuel efficiency improvement, but no efficiency norms have been issued by 
the government so far. 
The reduction of actual fuel consumption would also be a factor of road quality and other 
infrastructure and improvements in that would mean substantial costs. The efforts are on in this 
direction with improvements in road conditions, addition of flyovers, bus rapid transport, and 
the Golden Quadrilateral project, etc. but there is a long way to go. It is important to mention 
that a large share of transportation in India is still non-motorised. Furthermore, within 
personalised transport, the largest share is that of two-wheelers. The cars in India are generally 
small in size, leading to lower fuel consumption per km in contrast to that in developed 
countries. Consumers’ sensitivity to the fuel bill has forced the manufacturers to make 
continuous efficiency improvements over the years. 
In the energy efficient lighting, Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs) have been in the market for 
more than 15 years. During this period, costs have come down manifold, yet the technology has 
not been able to make a dent in the market. The concerns related to extreme power shortages 
have led the utilities to find innovative means for bringing down the CFL cost and their large-
scale promotion. Many of them are now getting into bulk purchases and are offering that to the 
consumers at relatively lower prices thus bringing in the economies of scale. CFL promotion 
will get a further boost with incumbent performance guarantee and innovations in the product 
mix to cater to aesthetic aspirations of the affluent sections. 
The residential and commercial sector offers enormous opportunity for intervention and in the 
recent past the Bureau of Energy Efficiency introduced the Energy Conservation Building Code. 
The purpose of this code is to provide minimum requirements for the energy-efficient design 
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commercial buildings or building complexes that have a connected load of 500 kW or greater or 
a contract demand of 600 kVA or greater. The code is also applicable to all buildings with a 
conditioned floor area of 1,000 m
2 or greater. For effective implementation of and compliance 
with this provision, technical skill, know-how development and long-term planning would be 
required. 
With respect to improving the efficiency of consumer appliances, a scheme on Energy 
Efficiency Labelling has been launched by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency of the Government 
of India. Participation in the scheme is voluntary and currently applicable for the following 
equipments: 
1.  Frost-free refrigerators, 
2.  Tubular fluorescent lamps, 
3.  Room air conditioners, 
4.  Desert coolers and 
5.  Distribution transformer. 
The scheme has been developed in collaboration with all the stakeholders, and aims at providing 
information on energy performance so that consumers can make informed decisions when 
purchasing appliances. The labelling of other equipment and appliances would be introduced in 
a phased manner. Informal feedback received from shopkeepers reveals a positive response by 
consumers to this initiative and demand for products with higher energy labels. 
Due to the market de-regulation, high energy costs and the availability of efficient technologies, 
major industries in India are able to reduce their energy consumption by a great percentage. In 
fact, energy efficiency of the most efficient plants in some of the industries – namely cement, 
fertilizers and refineries – is among the best in the world. However, the medium and small-scale 
industries have a long way to go. 
To summarise, the key barriers to the adoption of the options listed above could be grouped into 
lack of funding, access to technologies, confidence on technology, awareness generation, 
capacity-building, etc. Some of these barriers could be released through domestic policy 
interventions while for others additional support through bilateral collaboration may be helpful. 
There may still be some barriers, which would require wider international policy support.  
The following section discusses some of these potential remedies. 
4. Way  forward 
The potential mitigation opportunities listed in Tables 2 to 4 need to be reassessed to find out 
how these could be freed of the associated barriers and implemented in a successful manner 
through appropriate policy interventions or the introduction of programmes. Potential policy 
interventions and programmes could broadly be classified under following three categories: 
1)  those that can be released through domestic action; 
2)  those that require additional funding or support from abroad, e.g. through bilateral 
collaboration; and 
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4.1 Domestic  actions 
4.1.1  Improving energy efficiency in large industries 
The market forces and government policies exist to a great extent for the large-scale industries. 
There is a need for up-scaling the activities in this category. The government of India enacted 
the Energy Conservation Act in 2001 to promote more efficient management of our scarce 
energy resources. The Act promotes competition, sharing of information, creating awareness 
and motivating stakeholders. It encourages a transparent and a self-regulating mechanism to 
promote energy efficiency. Under the Act, the government of India has notified nine energy-
intensive industrial sectors, namely thermal power stations, fertilizer, cement iron and steel, 
chlor alkali, aluminium, railways, textile and pulp and paper, as designated consumers, who are 
required to employ a certified energy manager, and also conduct energy audits periodically. In 
addition, the designated energy consumers are also required to adhere to any specific energy 
consumption norms that may be prescribed. Further, for adoption of energy efficiency measures 
in the small- and medium-scale industries, it is imperative to promote energy audits in these 
units to come out with unit specific suggestive measures. 
In order to bridge the gap between the industries with world-class energy efficiency, and those 
with poor performance, the government is initiating a programme to develop energy-efficiency 
improvement targets for industries within each sector. This would lead to a narrowing of the 
energy-efficiency bandwidth, as well as to a decrease in the sectoral average specific energy 
consumption. 
4.1.2  Interventions in SMEs 
The small and medium enterprise plays an important role in the Indian economy accounting for 
about 40% of the gross value of output in the manufacturing sector and contributing to over 
34% of total exports from the country. The sector is plagued with the use of obsolete 
technologies, non-availability of ready-made technological solutions, a low level of 
awareness/information availability, non-availability of technology providers at local/cluster 
level and relatively high cost of technologies and poor access to finance and is thus faced with 
low energy-use efficiency. 
As the technological and financial capacities of the SMEs are limited and they are not able to 
undertake technology upgrading on their own, the government has taken a few steps to support 
this requirement. Some of these examples include a Technology Upgrading Fund Scheme for 
textile industry, Credit Linked Capital Subsidy Scheme and Credit Guarantee Fund Scheme for 
Small Industries. 
−  Technology Upgrading Fund Scheme 
TUFS for textile industry was initiated by the Ministry of Textiles in the year 1999 with a 
view to sustaining as well as improving the competitiveness and overall long-term viability 
of the textile sector. The scheme intends to provide timely and adequate capital at 
internationally comparable rates of interest in order to upgrade the textile industry's 
technology level. This type of initiative could be of help to other industries as well. 
−  Credit Linked Capital Subsidy Scheme (CLCSS) 
The objective of the scheme is to facilitate technology upgrading of tiny and small-scale 
industry (SSI units) by providing 12% capital subsidy for the induction of proven 
technologies in a host of sectors. 
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The government approved the Credit Guarantee Fund Scheme for Small Industries in May 
2000, with the objective of making available credit to SSI units, particularly tiny units, for 
loans up to $ 25,000 without collateral/third party guarantees.  
Keeping in view the large expanse of SMEs across a range of sectors, the schemes mentioned 
above are not sufficient and need to be scaled up several folds. The opportunities offered by the 
carbon markets and its potential variants and offshoots in the future should also be explored to 
support the upscaling. Further, the above schemes should have a linkage with the Clean 
Investment Framework for coherence between the international climate approach and domestic 
frameworks to realise the benefits on a large scale.  
Most energy-efficient equipment requires higher upfront investment. In some of the renewable 
energy technologies, government provides for accelerated depreciation up to 80% in the first 
year. A similar kind of provision of accelerated depreciation on energy efficient equipment 
would definitely increase the deployment of such equipment. Further, a reduced rate of value 
added tax (VAT) on energy-efficient products would also help in reducing the high upfront 
investment to some extent. 
4.1.3  Policy and regulatory regimes for promotion of climate change actions  
There is a need to review existing policies and programmes across various sectors to assess if 
they support climate change actions and encourage domestic industries to take a proactive 
approach in improving energy efficiency and addressing climate change. Further, such a probing 
and appropriate policy intervention would also help provide a healthy investment climate for 
promoting required investments. Appropriate government backing and investment flows would 
help develop the markets for energy efficiency.  
4.1.4  Large-scale awareness generation 
Knowledge about energy efficiency and technological choices is increasing in India. 
Nevertheless, in view of the large size of the country, the information needs to be spread to all 
the different sections and to all the different parts of the country. An informed market and 
society will help the energy-efficiency and climate-change agenda to take off. 
Moving on to the bilateral and international levels, Table 5 provides an overview of possible 
remedies to release the emissions mitigation potential in India at these levels.  
Table 5. Possible remedies to potential barriers 
Barrier  Possible Remedy – Bilateral   Possible Remedy – International 
Climate Policy Collaboration  
Lacking funding   Venture capital 
Collaboration on planning 
reforms 
Funding programmes 
Collaboration on institutional 
reforms; Assisted economic 
reforms 
CDM or related project-based 
mechanism 
Clean investment fund 
Global price through emissions 
trading 
Global price through harmonised 
national tax 
Access to patents and 
technology 
Joint research programmes 
Joint ventures 
Research collaboration 
Sector agreement (with 
benchmark) for specific industries 
(e.g. cement or aluminium) 
Research and technology 
agreement 
Awareness and 
capacity-building  
Joint venture  Joint information and education 
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4.2  Policies and measures that require additional funding or support 
from abroad, e.g. through bilateral collaboration 
4.2.1  Clean Investment Framework and Funds  
Most of the energy-efficiency improvement initiatives require high upfront investment and there 
is a need to explore various possible options to support such actions in developing countries. 
Various possible sources to contribute to such a fund include the following: 
−  Financial support from Annex I countries for large-scale technology deployment and 
diffusion of established technologies 
There is a strong need for large-scale deployment of established technologies in developed 
and developing countries. Cooperation among countries with regard to transfer of 
technologies can play an important role in the promotion of these technologies by a broad 
set of countries, thus making a significant contribution to climate change mitigation. 
Developing countries, due to their weak technological and financial capacities, depend on 
developed countries for their climate change mitigation actions. Realising this differential 
capability of countries, the UNFCCC called for Annex II countries to take all practicable 
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing 
country Parties. 
−  Mobilisation of public and private sector funding and investment, including facilitation of 
climate-friendly investment choices 
The role of public sector in the transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs) 
becomes particularly important, as there happen to be weak pricing mechanisms or policies 
to incorporate environmental costs. The public sector typically engages in long-term and 
infrastructure investment projects. Initiatives promoting technology transfer have mostly 
taken the shape of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) contributions. Overall, a 
downward trend has been seen in ODA, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
funding for projects. 
Private sector initiatives essentially require a strong macroeconomic and environmental 
framework to adequately support ESTs, so that they are financially viable. Even if this is the 
case, it may not cover other aspects of concern to financial markets such as the significance 
of climate change to their businesses or the risks involved. The private sector finds it most 
difficult to finance high-risk and long-term projects – the very nature of ESTs (low 
operating costs and high up-front expenditure). 
−  Venture capital 
For encouraging technology research and development, the role of venture capital could be 
explored. Venture capital for technology innovation is a special type of financing 
arrangement as its provisions are customised to the needs of the receiver and the skills of 
the provider. Venture capital for technology innovation could be used for the following 
purposes:  
o  Seed financing – which could be given to the developer of the technology, 
o  Start up financing – which could be given to the technology developer for product 
development and initial marketing, 
o  First stage financing – which could be given for the technology transfer to take place 
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o  Second stage financing – for expansion of the scale of production from the technology 
and 
o  Later stage financing – for large-scale expansion of an enterprise that has been already 
profitable. 
The use of venture capital through interaction between technologists, entrepreneurs would 
contribute towards taking the new technologies for climate change to the market. These 
funds could be used for purposes carrying high risks and hence the term-lending structure of 
these funds has to be designed in such a way so that the provider of the venture capital 
knows that the funds would be used for high-risk investments. So the funders would be 
ready to accept the high risks of failure, which has to be reflected in the interest rate 
structures (cost of capital). The returns from these funds could also be high and hence the 
providers of venture capital for climate change have to work in a high-risk-high-return 
framework of financing. 
A broad framework for clean investment would encourage the developing countries to frame 
appropriate policies and initiate suitable programmes having linkages with such a framework. 
Further availability of funds through the options mentioned above would help in deploying and 
diffusing existing technologies to a great extent. The availability of such a fund may also trigger 
adoptions of certain technologies at the threshold of economic viability if the fund can support 
the upfront cost.  
4.2.2  Training and capacity-building 
Funding alone for technology transfer cannot ensure the success of a particular technology. It is 
the role of policy to provide instruments for capacity-building to absorb technological 
intervention to make the transfer effective. Strengthening technological know-how will also 
help to review and upgrade national strategic approaches. Timely and regular review of actions 
and programmes will help to ensure regular upgrading by identifying the missing linkages. 
However, inadequate spending by the government undermines such actions. 
4.3  Policies and measures that require a wider international policy 
support 
4.3.1  Carbon markets and carbon funds 
The carbon markets – CDM, JI, the EU ETS, etc. provide a boost to the introduction of clean 
and environmentally sound technology-based projects. CDM, which is the presently available 
carbon market for India, by design envisaged technological transfer to developing countries 
from Annex I countries and financial resources through carbon trading. Participation in CDM 
provides an opportunity to developing countries to get these resources for complementing their 
sustainable development efforts.  
India has been quite proactive in the CDM field and has the distinction of having the maximum 
number of projects registered with the CDM Executive Board. More than 500 million CERs are 
expected out of these projects, amounting to more than $18,000 million.  
Continuity of the carbon market post-2012 and a sizeable market will encourage further actions. 
Further, the CDM projects so far have been individual projects whereas there is a need to 
transform sectoral activities or activities under a policy or programme of the government of 
India into CDM projects. This will have the dual benefit of sectoral improvements and 
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4.3.2  Intellectual property right (IPRs) 
Intellectual property rights are often cited as a barrier to the transfer of technologies. It is 
difficult to arrive at a conclusion with respect to the exact amount of impact that IPR has on 
technology transfer either by way of reduced access or increased prices. In order to ascertain 
this, there is a need to carry out a detailed product-by-product and country-by-country analysis. 
However, there is some level of agreement in regard to IPRs having an impact on technology 
diffusion. In light of this, there have been many suggestions in the recent past to address IPRs as 
a challenge in efficient transfer of technology that is useful for mitigating climate change. These 
range from trying out compulsory licensing to joint ownership to technology acquisition and 
knowledge repository funds.  
4.3.3  Technology transfer and adaptation to suit Indian conditions 
Technology transfer should be considered in its true sense i.e. not merely the transfer of the 
equipment but also training and capacity-building in the know-how. It is commonly observed 
that during the process of technology transfer, the know-how is transferred but know-why is an 
area that is relatively ignored and needs to be addressed. Unless these components are also a 
part of the technology transfer, the benefits gained would not be substantial. Further, there 
would also be a need for customisation of the technologies to adapt to Indian condition so as to 
work at the optimum efficiency. This should, therefore, be an integral part of any collaboration 
on technologies.  
4.3.4  Collaborative research and development 
Joint research and development is suggested to be another means to address the issues related to 
intellectual property rights. The viability of such proposals, however, needs to be examined 
through some pilot projects. The future climate regime should be designed in such a manner that 
it provides incentives for technology development and transfer, through enabling collaborative 
R&D and/or transfer as part of commitments by Annex I countries. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper presents an overview of some of the large development challenges India still faces. 
Even though economic development is the primary concern of the country, many climate 
change mitigation activities are being undertaken, albeit often with a view to addressing energy 
savings and security issues, Furthermore, a bottom-up analysis of various sectors shows that the 
Indian economy offers significant opportunities for GHG emissions reductions even as it 
continues to grow. The learning from a bottom-up and sectoral approach needs to be integrated 
into the current discussions of a new international climate change regime to a larger extent than 
it has been in the past. A future climate regime should contain mechanisms for releasing barriers 
to specific technological and institutional measures at the international level and provide 
incentives for interventions at the country or even local level. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2005, there has been increasing interest in ‘global sectoral approaches’ to address climate 
change. Key developments have been the 2005 OECD high-level roundtable on transnational 
sectoral agreements for climate policy and the July 2005 G8 Gleneagles Plan of Action. In 
parallel, there have been calls for the analysis of sectoral dimensions, including 
‘competitiveness’ issues and sectoral approaches within the negotiations of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Sectoral approaches have been prominent during 
the global climate change negotiations in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007. The Bali Action 
Plan includes a specific reference to sectoral approaches, thereby ensuring that they are part of 
the negotiations for the post-2012 agreement. One of the earliest examples of sectoral 
approaches can be found in the sectoral task forces organised under the Asia-Pacific Partnership 
on Clean Development and Climate.
1 
Within the EU, the Communication on climate change prepared by the European Commission 
(2007a) for the March European Council, which subsequently adopted the EU integrated 
climate and energy policy, made explicit reference to “sectoral approaches” albeit within the 
context of “action in developing countries”. The European Commission’s High-Level Group on 
Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment in its fifth report (European Commission, 2007b, 
p. 3) calls for a “roadmap … to set out the route to operationalise sectoral approaches”. Finally, 
the Commission’s proposal to revamp the EU Emissions Trading Scheme post-2012 in Article 
10b (European Commission, 2008, p. 26), which deals with “measures to support certain energy 
intensive industries in the event of carbon leakage”, states that any “binding sectoral agreements 
… subject to mandatory enforcement arrangements” shall be taken into account if measures 
countering carbon leakage are designed.  
2.  Why sectoral approaches? 
Even in absence of an agreed global long-term target, the urgency of addressing climate change 
is now accepted. This has been reiterated by the Gleneagles and Heiligendamm G8 summits, the 
Major Economies Meetings and through the reference in the Bali Action Plan to the work of the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. At the same time, global CO2  emissions from energy 
production and use are expected to grow rapidly. For example, the 2007 World Energy Outlook 
issued by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2007), representing all OECD countries, 
projects that if governments stick with current policies, the world’s primary energy needs would 
grow by 55% between 2005 and 2030, at an average annual rate of 1.8% per year. As fossil 
fuels are expected to remain the dominant source of primary energy, accounting for 84% of the 
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overall demand increase, global energy-related CO2 emissions between 2005 and 2030 are 
projected to grow too. CO2 emissions are expected to rise by 57% between 2005 and 2030. 
Developing countries, whose populations and economies are the fastest growing, would 
contribute 74% of the increase in global primary energy use in this scenario. If greenhouse gas 
(GHG) concentrations are to be stabilised at a level that would prevent dangerous interference 
with the climate system, there is no doubt that urgent action is needed.  
As Baron et al. (2007) note, implementation of binding emissions reduction targets such as in 
the EU and other developed countries has led to the search for a solution to issues such as 
competitive distortions and carbon leakage due to asymmetric carbon policies. Sectoral 
approaches are currently been explored, as they are seen as capable of:  
•  moderating competitiveness concerns in trade-exposed industries, e.g. by engaging sectors 
on a more global basis; thereby 
•  enhancing the scope of greenhouse gas mitigation, especially in emerging economies, 
through sector-specific objectives and instruments, and  
•  building commitments (e.g. targets) from a bottom-up sectoral analysis, which is regarded 
as being potentially more equitable.  
Some industrial sectors are concentrated to such a degree that even a small number of 
companies represent a significant share of global emissions (see Box 1). A focus on major 
companies in a limited number of sectors holds out the promise to cover a relatively large 
percentage of emissions with one single policy that would apply across borders while assuaging 
concerns over competitiveness. 
Box 1. Candidates in industry for sectoral approaches 
Aluminium  0.9% of world GHG emissions (2004) 
  10 biggest producers = 54% of the world market 
Cement  4.6% of world GHG emissions (2005) 
  10 biggest producers = 25% of global output 
Steel  5.22% of world GHG emissions (2005) [direct emissions only] 
  10 biggest producers = 26% of global output  
  20 biggest producers = 35% of global output 
Other potential candidates include other energy-intensive industries such as float glass, a few 
heavy chemical industries, paper and pulp.  
Sources: Vieillefosse (2007) and Baron et al. (2007). 
3.  Typology of sectoral approaches 
There are several sectoral approach and models, which can be distinguished as follows: 
•  Bottom-up, government-led developing country commitments, possibly combined with ‘no-
lose’ targets,
2  
                                                      
2 Under a system of ‘no-lose’ targets, developing countries would accept voluntarily a reduction target, 
and any reduction units that go beyond the targets would be ‘credited’ and allocated to either industry or 
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•  Top-down sectoral crediting as an incentive mechanism, e.g. a sectoral Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). 
•  Global sectoral industry approaches, e.g. transnational industry-led approaches that aim at 
engaging a sector on a broad international basis or global sectoral industry approaches 
(“Sector-wide transnational industry approaches” according the IEA typology). 
Each model is described briefly below. 
3.1  Government-led sectoral approaches 
The discussions about global sectoral industry approaches have been fuelled by a number of 
concepts involving elements of general sectoral approaches. Most of these approaches 
emphasise the role of a government. 
•  One model is the ‘no-lose’ target concept developed by the Center for Clean Air Policy in 
Washington, D.C. (see Schmidt et al., 2006). It describes a bottom-up method for 
encouraging sector-wide actions in developing countries, mainly emerging economies. 
Developing countries voluntarily accept a reduction target, expressed in either absolute or 
relative terms. Reductions that go beyond the targets will be ‘credited’ to either industry or 
governments and can be sold into carbon markets. The incentive for reducing GHG 
emissions is the potential reward in the form of credits. A CCAP (2006) study has identified 
what are claimed to be cost-effective emissions reductions for Brazil, China and India for 
electricity, cement, transport, paper and steel industries from 17 to 29% below business as 
usual levels in 2020.  
•  The Washington-based PEW Center on Global Climate Change has explored a concept that 
focuses on linking voluntary ‘bottom-up’ commitments to a common global framework. 
Such International Sectoral Agreements in a post-2012 Climate Framework foresee 
multilateral agreements in which governments commit to actions intended to moderate or 
reduce GHG emissions from a given sector via i) one or several stand-alone sectoral 
agreements, ii) a series of agreements linked under a common framework or iii) sectoral 
commitments as a complement to a comprehensive global climate change agreement (see 
Bodansky, 2007). 
3.2  Sectoral crediting  
Another model focuses on incentives for developing countries – emerging economies and others 
– to take on a unilateral commitment, motivated by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
of possible new crediting mechanisms. This could include the bundling of projects or the 
definition of a sectoral benchmark that allows crediting of all projects below the benchmark or 
crediting for policies that reduce emissions such as a congestion charge or refurbishing of 
houses. Theoretically, a programmatic CDM could allow for programmatic crediting, i.e. 
several projects undertaken and submitted to the CDM Executive Board by intermediaries. 
Closely related to this is sectoral crediting, which has been explored in-depth by the OECD/IEA 
(see Baron & Ellis, 2006). This approach foresees the sale of certified emission reductions 
(CERs) into a carbon market, such as the EU emissions trading scheme.  
3.3  Global sectoral industry approaches  
If judged by participation, momentum or public exposure, industry initiatives to date are the 
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•  Discussions are currently taking place within the cement sector in the context of the Cement 
Sustainability Initiative (CSI) under the auspices of the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The initiative first focused on a data-gathering 
exercise called ‘Getting the numbers right’, including a data base for existing technologies 
in the sector and a benchmarking system. In a second step, the CSI is moving towards 
policy proposals entailing possible country or regional baselines, negotiated with 
governments to form the basis of intensity-based objectives and a crediting system. 
Governments of emerging economies could engage through no-lose targets (see below), 
which then most likely would be broken down into sectoral sub-targets. The initiative 
examines as well how a cement sectoral approach could fit in with EU climate change 
priorities and notably the EU ETS.  
•  The International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), representing some 200 steel-producing 
companies, including those from China, Russia and India, covering more than 70% of 
global steel production, proposed to replace cap and trade emissions trading regimes in May 
2007 with a sector-specific framework that, among other things, encourages the phase-out 
of obsolete technologies. The IISI has invited governments to support the steel industry’s 
long-term research initiatives for radical new technology solutions by encouraging 
demonstration and to engage with industry to develop reporting procedures (Jitsuhara, 
2007). According to Baron et al. (2007, p. 60), under the APP and with bilateral support to 
China in particular, steel companies have launched a data-gathering exercise to establish 
indicators for the two main production routes.  
•  The most comprehensive initiative is the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate (APP), formally launched in January 2006. It consists of seven partner 
countries – Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United 
States. The initial six partner countries, i.e. excluding Canada, account for 45% of global 
GDP, 50% of GHG emissions and 48% of global energy use (Government of Australia, 
2007), and produce about 65% of the world’s coal, 48% of the world’s steel, 37% of the 
world’s aluminium and 61% of the world’s cement. As a multilateral and a regional public-
private partnership between industry and governments, APP focuses on the one hand on 
industry sector cooperation across countries to develop and deploy advanced technologies 
and on the other, on regulatory reform to remove identified barriers to technology 
development and deployment. The backbone is sectoral task forces where business, 
government and scientific researchers cooperate. The APP covers data-gathering and 
benchmarking exercises for three energy suppliers (cleaner fossil energy, renewable energy 
and distributed generation, power generation and transmission) and five energy-intensive 
sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, coal mining, buildings and appliances) (see Fujiwara, 
2007 and APP, 2007).  
•  In the aluminium sector, participants in the sectoral approach of the International 
Aluminium Institute (IAI), a group of major aluminium producers worldwide, have set 
themselves a voluntary objective of achieving an 80% reduction of PFC (process) emissions 
and a 10% reduction in energy intensity, compared to 1990, by 2010. Having nearly reached 
the PFC reduction objective already, the IAI is considering setting more stringent targets for 
2020. Discussions are being pursued within the industry on the potential applicability of a 
global sector crediting, no-lose model. The approach is based on an externally audited, 
comprehensive data-gathering system, under an IPPC-recognised protocol, from which the 
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Additional initiatives exist such as the IEA’s benchmarking exercise in the context of the 
implementation of the Gleneagles Plan of Action (GPOA).
3 Some stakeholders in the power 
sector are exploring the potential for a coordinated sectoral approach to mitigate GHG 
emissions.
4 
•  A different model aims at setting global standards of specific products such as appliances, 
insulation or cars (e.g. CO2 emissions or fuel efficiency). Examples are renewable energy 
quotas or feed-in tariffs but also EU or global energy efficiency or car efficiency standards. 
•  Other schemes aim at developing international cooperation on the special transport modes 
of aviation or maritime transport, which have been excluded from the Kyoto Protocol (see 
WBCSD, 2004; Åhman, 2008; Zetterberg, 2008).  
Since industry-led approaches are the most developed among the initiatives under consideration, 
the following analysis will concentrate on this category.  
4.  Global sectoral industry approaches: Common elements  
Without a doubt, the different industry-led models as well as all other sectoral approaches will 
evolve and develop as work on sectoral approaches within sectors and governments progresses. 
Irrespective of which model is preferred, there are a number of central elements that are 
common to all sector-wide industry approaches to date, as discussed below. 
•  Transparency, i.e. respect for confidentiality, collection of information and data (verified) 
about the status of a sector, e.g. benchmarking in different forms such as i) setting the sector 
boundaries, ii) documenting current industry performance on agreed simple metrics or key 
performance indicators and iii) identifying best-practice, i.e. comparing performance of 
equipment, plants or countries to this best practice, which in the longer-term could help 
identify common medium-term goals.  
•  Sharing and spreading of best practice within companies to increase operational efficiency, 
including diffusion of technology within the sector, typically to improve performance of the 
least efficient installations.  
•  Engaging governments and notably big installations of major industries in emerging 
economies, which is where most of the emissions growth and the reduction potential lie. 
Incentives to major industries can take many different forms.
5  
There are potential and actual additional benefits from sectoral approaches, although they do not 
apply to all initiatives and models.  
                                                      
3 The IEA was tasked by the Gleneagles G8 summit to identify best practice and indicate potential for 
improvements in energy efficiency in buildings, appliances, transport and industry. As a result, the IEA 
has embarked on an in-depth analysis of indicators to provide state-of-the-art data and analysis on energy 
use, efficiency developments and good policy practices. 
4 For example work undertaken by the Japanese power industry (Tachibana, 2007) focuses on i) keeping 
energy efficiency in existing plants, ii) deploying best-available technology to new power plants and iii) 
accelerating research, development and deployment. 
5 They can include, for example, technical assistance to improve operational efficiency or carbon 
management to exploit no-regret options, access to improved technology through speeding up of 
technology diffusion (of off-the-shelf technology/know-how) and/or developing sector-based GHG 
credits, e.g. through sectoral crediting or sector-based (CDM) crediting. They could also consist of threats 
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•  Sharing of best-practices of governments in order to remove regulatory and other barriers to 
rational energy use and technology diffusion. By definition this element is limited to 
initiatives that involve governments in some form. This element is most prominent in the 
APP. 
•  Joint learning between governments and business to better understand each other and jointly 
solve the problems of climate change.  
•  In some cases, sectoral approaches include cooperation in development of new 
breakthrough technologies such as the case of the CO2 breakthrough programme of the 
International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI).  
As a side-effect, the use of benchmarks, which are at the core of sectoral approaches, could add 
a rational element for definition of national goals and commitments, cap-setting and allocation 
(in the event that free allocation is chosen as an allocation methodology). Data definition and 
collection from sectoral approaches will provide governments with a more thorough base for 
abatement potentials in a given sector to allow them to set targets in a more equitable way while 
also ensuring that targets are achievable. 
5.  Main challenges for global sectoral industry approaches  
In order to live up to expectations, however, sector-wide industry approaches as well as sectoral 
approaches at large will need to meet a number of tests. We have identified four crucial 
challenges that global sectoral industry approaches will need to meet in order to go forward.  
5.1  Data definition, collection and use  
As a micro-level analysis, benchmarking is very data-intensive. Existing transnational industry 
approaches are designed as bottom-up schemes to collect information about the status of a 
sector, e.g. performance benchmarking. Therefore, there is rich experience regarding data 
collection and use within existing global sectoral industry approaches such as the ones initiated 
under the auspices of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) CSI, 
the IAI and the IISI in addition to APP. The CSI for example has started a data-gathering 
exercise – “Getting the numbers right”. Participating companies will need to provide data for all 
their plants, for the years 1990, 2000, 2005, as a start. In parallel, the APP task force on cement 
is also collecting energy and CO2 data in partner countries. Both initiatives use the WBCSD 
Cement CO2 protocol. Similar initiatives are being taken by the IAI and the IISI.  
5.2  Risk of anti-competitive behaviour  
Global sectoral industry approaches almost by definition represent a form of sector-wide 
coordinated activity. This in return may raise anti-trust concerns in different national or regional 
jurisdictions. There is a risk that the potentially expanded roles of industry groupings or 
associations may raise antitrust concerns not only because they represent a sizable part of the 
global market but also because the cooperation moves closer to issues that relate to how the 
market functions. This can be solved by the use of independent 3
rd parties to protect 
confidentiality of participants’ information. 
5.3  Incentives to emerging economies industries  
A precondition for global sectoral industry approaches to achieve one of its two main 
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major companies of key energy-intensive industries in emerging economies, where most of the 
additional emissions will come from. However, developing country governments may see 
sectoral approaches as a means to push them to binding commitments.  
Engaging companies in emerging economies will therefore depend on offering suitable 
incentives. These could include on the one hand transfers of funding through crediting 
mechanisms between developed and developing countries and on the other, sector-level 
cooperation to focus on improving the performance of the least efficient companies.  
Yet even if these incentives work, they depend on a number of preconditions, as listed below. 
•  Sectoral crediting and/or the no-lose target concept depend(s) on data availability and 
collection, especially for the initial baseline data in industry in emerging economies.  
•  A second concern is developing country governments’ capacity to deal with the 
complexities of crediting. Already the CDM in some cases tested the capacity of developing 
country governments. Sectoral crediting would be even more challenging.
6  
•  Crediting would reinforce the advantageous competitive position of big companies of 
emerging economies vis-à-vis companies in Annex I countries. Many industry sectors in 
developed economies regard ‘massive’ crediting as a subsidy to their competitors in 
emerging economies, which thereby may reinforce rather than reduce competitiveness 
impacts on their business. Again, some sort of political deal would be needed, e.g. a 
departure from ‘pure’ crediting by setting more ambitious baselines (e.g. beyond business-
as-usual) or to set a sunset clause or to develop a graduation threshold for developing 
countries beyond which they cannot claim credit for undercutting business-as-usual 
emissions. Whether this would generate sufficient incentives is an open question. 
5.4 Governance 
Sectoral industry approaches face various governance
7 challenges, notably at the level of 
industry itself, in developing countries/emerging economies and within the UNFCCC 
secretariat. Another critical issue is the administrative capacity in some developing countries, 
i.e. how governments in emerging economies and developing countries in general can 
implement not only monitoring, reporting and verification but also baseline-setting and 
enforcement. A precondition for governance challenges to be met is that the UNFCCC 
secretariat or another organisation that is tasked as secretariat for a global climate change 
agreement will be able to handle the technical complexities surrounding sectoral approaches. 
Negotiations under the UNFCCC to date are political negotiations, whereas negotiations on 
technical issues tend to be delegated to other bodies. Many existing non-Annex I delegations 
                                                      
6 Establishing a proper methodology can be technically tedious while politically contentious. Baron et al. 
(2007) assume that because of diversity among countries and sectors and complexity, sector-wide 
crediting will require a political deal at country, i.e. party level to set up the effort based on which credits 
would accrue. Such a deal could be made within or outside the UNFCCC framework.  
7 All sectoral approaches reviewed here could theoretically be conceived either as a separate, i.e. stand-
alone pillar in an overall global policy framework, e.g. sectoral industry agreements as part of the post-
2012 framework or as a complementary, perhaps cross-cutting element of national, regional or 
international policies and frameworks. Ultimately, the two may even converge. A third possibility is to 
regard sectoral approaches as an intermediate step between now and the agreement of a comprehensive 
global agreement. Given that sectoral approaches are very data-intensive and complex, it is unlikely, 
however, that government and stakeholders would engage in such a time-consuming exercise for a 
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might find it difficult to handle the technical complexities that a sectoral approach for cement, 
aluminium or steel involves (see Baron et al., 2007; Bradley et al., 2007]).  
6.  Global sectoral industry approaches under the UNFCCC 
To date global sectoral industry approaches are mainly bottom-up approaches that attempt to 
formulate sector-wide commitments. They are only starting to deal with the thorny issue of how 
to fit them into a global climate change agreement. To date, initial global sectoral industry 
approaches have the potential to put both national policies and measures and international 
negotiations onto a firmer footing. This can take various forms, e.g. i) identifying win-win 
mitigation options, ii) interpreting “common but differentiated responsibilities”, iii) discovering 
abatement potentials that could unlock the reluctance of some negotiation partners, iv) realising 
cost-effective solutions, based on a good industry understanding, or v) making efforts 
comparable. Global sectoral industry approaches could also become a tool for the development 
and deployment of technologies. The IISI CO2 breakthrough programme is the best-known 
example of such an approach. This could also include the development of a joint protocol to be 
approved by the UNFCCC, as has been the case with the aluminium protocol.  
Any link of sectoral approaches to a global agreement will most likely need to rely on a high 
degree of both intergovernmental and industry cooperation with enforcement ensured by 
national governments. This could either be done within a ‘pledge-and-review’ model or possibly 
even combined with some sort of inter-governmental cooperation framework.  
Another issue, which has been explored in greater depth by the OECD/IEA is the risk of 
creating sectoral ‘CO2 havens’. One of the fundamental principles of global climate change 
policy is to ensure equal costs on different emitting activities. Different marginal abatement 
costs between sectors increase the overall economy-wide costs in achieving a given climate 
change target. A solution will need to be elaborated in the way sectoral industry approaches are 
linked to GHG emissions trading schemes or more generally, to the global carbon market.  
7.  Global sectoral industry approaches in an EU perspective  
If sectoral approaches will be taken further in the EU, they will need to fit into EU policy 
priorities. The potentially strongest link between sectoral approaches and EU policies are with 
the EU ETS and the global carbon market. Benchmarks could play a useful role for cap-setting 
(i.e. agreeing the overall target) and/or allocation, i.e. distribution of allowances among the 
installations, for the development of global carbon markets and finally as a means to engage 
developing countries.  
•  If sectoral benchmarks – understood as a rate of CO2  emissions per unit of intake – 
production or activity are based on ‘best practice’ or best-available technology in a sector, 
they can be used for setting the cap.  
•  A second possible application of sectoral benchmarks is for allocation, provided that free 
allocation continues. While initial free allocation of the EU ETS Directive has been based 
on grandfathering (i.e. based on historical emissions), the draft Directive foresees the use of 
benchmarks, if applied in a harmonised way across the EU. Global benchmarks would do 
away with EU efforts to develop them. 
•  A third potential application of benchmarks relates to ‘linked carbon markets’. For the 
period 2013-20, before a single global carbon market is expected to be in place, the EU 
foresees the development of a global carbon market through linking of the EU ETS with 
other domestic emissions trading schemes. Linking however may require adjustment in 64 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA 
 
design options between different schemes. It may be facilitated and accelerated in as much 
as central design options such as MRV,
8 cap-setting and (free) allocation are converging. 
Sectoral approaches, including benchmarks, could facilitate such convergence.  
•  Experiences from data collection and benchmarking exercises under sectoral approaches 
could possibly become a tool to give a concrete meaning to the Bali Developing Country 
Paragraph. Both “measuring, reporting and verification” of “actions” to which developing 
countries have signed up in the Bali Action Plan and “measurable and verifiable” assistance 
in financing and technology transfer by developed countries – a commitment since the 
UNFCCC and discussed in greater detail in Background Paper No. 1 – may be more easily 
implemented at sectoral level.  
8. Final  remark 
Irrespective of whether global sectoral industry approaches as we know them will successfully 
address the challenges that have been identified in this report, through their bottom-up and 
cooperative nature and data gathering, they already now positively affect the depth, speed and 
direction of the post-2012 discussions in at least two major ways. First, global sectoral industry 
approaches have the merit not only of improving hard data on emissions, abatement potentials 
and costs, but also of illustrating successful ways to increase energy efficiency and to speed up 
the diffusion of existing technology and the development of new technology. Therefore, they 
are likely to lead to real GHG emissions reductions. Second and perhaps even more important is 
the fact that global sectoral industry approaches represent a cooperative approach to a thorny, 
global, long-term problem. A growing number of people maintain that cooperative approaches 
to politically difficult, technically complex and long-term issues such as climate change are 
more appropriate than the traditional adversarial approach that has been dominant at least in the 
western world. Sectoral approaches offer perhaps the ideal way to develop a cooperative 
approach to climate change mitigation. It is increasingly clear that governments alone will not 
be able to achieve climate change objectives. Government efforts need to be combined with 
efforts by other stakeholders, notably industry and increasingly financial institutions.  
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